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Introduction
  
In the present work, we show the results of three empirical studies conducted on the Egyptian 
economy. Our aim is to add a contribution to some fields of research where the debate is still open 
and the results are yet inconclusive. 
Indeed, according to the economic theory, higher levels of education and openness should have a 
positive effect on GDP. Surprisingly, the econometric studies do not always support the theory and 
furthermore give contradictory results. The implementation of more sophisticated econometric 
techniques sheds lights to the limits of previous works, thus suggesting that one of the main causes 
for unconvincing results may be the choice of an inappropriate econometric approach. 
Following such critics, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this work deal with the effects of openness on 
GDP and implement two recent approaches to cointegration developed by Luetkepohl and by 
Pesaran et al respectively. In Chapter 1 we have instead studied the effects of education on GDP 
within the framework of a standard production function, though including an error correction term 
to account for long term effects. 
This work belongs to the field of studies conducted on time series, and therefore focuses on a single 
country with the purpose of accounting for country-specific variables or events that otherwise could 
not be included when dealing with cross-country data. 
Although Egypt and the neighbouring countries belonging to the so-called MENA region are quite 
ignored, in the recent decades they have implemented significant reforms, also with the support of 
international organization such as the IMF. Thus, we think that Egypt is an excellent case study to 
assess the effectiveness of the policies recommended by the economic theory. 
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Part 1 Education and growth: an error correction 
approach for Egypt  
Summary 
In this study an error-correction model has been applied to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to 
assess the contribution of human capital to economic growth in the case of Egypt. 
To our knowledge, the empirical evidence in this field comes mostly from cross-country studies, while the works 
focused on a single country time series are still very few. This paper aims at contributing to the research on a single-
country approach.  
Moreover, the case of Egypt is of particular interest since it experienced a fast growth in human capital expressed in 
terms of average years of education. At the same time, the Government introduced a system of incentives to higher 
education that led to distortions in the labour market and revealed to be unsustainable in the long-run. 
In line with expectations, the results show a negative impact of schooling on GDP per worker and a positive effect of 
physical capital, once a trend and some dummies are introduced in the model.  
1.1 The theoretical framework: an overview of the Solow model and growth 
accounting exercises 
In the latest decades, economists have tried to model the determinants of growth, in order to 
understand how to boost an economy: why some countries are rich and many others are still poor 
and how the poor can catch up with the rich were the questions to be answered.  
In the Solow textbook model, developed in the late 1950s, output is a function of two inputs, capital 
(K), labour (L) and of the exogenous technological change (A); this latter variable also reflects how 
efficiently labour and capital are used in the economy, therefore it represents productivity. The 
production function may be described in the Cobb-Douglas form as:  
(1) Y = AL  K1-
  
The model assumes constant returns to scale, so that the rate of growth of output is explained by the 
rate of growth of the inputs; what remains unexplained is the Solow residual, that (in the long run) 
represents the rate of growth of technology and can be interpreted as a measure of technological 
change: the total factor productivity (TFP). Recall that this interpretation is not believed to hold in 
the short run, when the Solow residual just reflects the effects of the business cycle.  
(2) ln (TFP) = ln (Y)  ln (L)  (1- ) ln (K)  
The results of the first growth accounting exercises were rather disappointing, in fact they came out 
with a residual as high as 50%, which is too large to explain technological change only. 
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In an attempt to improve the estimating power of the explaining variables, scholars have introduced 
the concept of quality-adjusted labour input, computed as the weighted average of the educational 
level of the workforce; under the assumption that more educated workers are more productive and 
that wage differentials reflect such productivity differences, one of the most used weights is the 
relative wage by educational level, computed with respect to a reference educational group.  
Of course, wage differentials may also reflect the so-called learning-by-doing (Lucas, 1988), that is 
the ability gained through a number of years of work in the same sector; in this case the contribution 
of education would be overestimated; furthermore, the human capital stock is usually computed as 
the formal educational attainment of a population: in cross-country comparisons this may be a limit 
to the significance of the results, since these measures may vary between countries. 
An alternative specification of the augmented Solow model includes a specific variable for human 
capital (H) - instead of merely adjusting the labour input - as stated in Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil 
(1992):  
(3) Y = K   H   (AL)(1- - )   
In their model, they apply the same production function to all the input variables and assume 
decreasing returns to all capitals, thus they do not treat human capital differently from the other 
goods; the proxy for the rate of human capital accumulation is the percentage of the working-age 
population in the secondary school. They run an OLS regression on their cross-country data set, that 
consists of 98 countries from the Summers-Heston database and covers the period 1960-1985. 
According to their results, the adjusted Solow model improves its predicting power: adding human 
capital, the coefficients on investment and population growth seem reasonable , either assuming 
the steady-state or not. Residual cross-country differences in income per capita may be explained by 
factors like tax policies, education policies and political stability. 
Furthermore, in their study Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil test the Solow model s prediction of 
conditional convergence as stated in Barro (1989), that is, the level of per capita incomes across 
countries should converge, controlling for the differences in the initial level of human capital, 
growth of the working-age population and investment. The results of the OLS regression are 
satisfactory, since the data support the hypothesis of convergence predicted by the augmented 
Solow model. 
Other studies use the same approach as Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil, but in general the results of 
these regressions are disappointing, since they fail to find a strong positive association between 
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education and growth: on the contrary, the relationship may also be negative and the results depend 
on the choice of the human capital indicators and on the specification of the model.  
For example, Lau, Jamison and Louat (1982) use the BESD database of the World Bank to analyse 
a set of 58 developing countries in five regions of the world from 1960 to 1987. They use the 
number of years of schooling as a proxy for human capital and assume that the production function 
is the same for all the countries in the sample. In their regression, the coefficients explaining the 
effect on growth of one more year of education change significantly over the regions, ranging from 
negative (Africa) to 5% per year (East Asia). Similar results, spread over a wide range, are also 
obtained considering primary and secondary education separately. Moreover, they find a positive 
relationship between the size of the effect of primary education (on growth) and the level of 
attainment: this may indicate that a minimum attendance of 4 years in the primary school is needed 
to have a significant impact of education on economic growth. 
On the other side, Islam (1995) starts from the work by Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil, but instead of 
a cross-country regression, he uses a panel data approach: the period 1960-1985 is divided into five-
years time intervals in order to obtain a panel cleaned by the business cycle disturbances that may 
arise with shorter time intervals.     
In Islam s view, OLS cross-country regressions are not suitable to take into account the country 
effect: in fact, differences in technologies and preferences are not observable or cannot be properly 
measured, therefore, in order to apply OLS, one needs to assume that the error term (the 
unobservable country effect) is independent from the other variables in the regression. If this 
assumption does not hold, a problem of unobservable variables bias arises, and it can be eliminated 
only applying the econometrics for panel data. However, in their cross-section exercise, Mankiw, D. 
Romer and Weil tried to take into account the country effect clustering the countries of the sample 
into homogeneous groups. The results in Islam s approach show that the rates of conditional 
convergence are higher than in a cross-section analysis. Panel data allow to account not only for 
differences among clusters but also for differences across individual countries.  
Regarding human capital, Islam uses the variable constructed by Barro and Lee (1993), that 
includes all levels of schooling, while the proxy in Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil was only related to 
secondary school enrolment. The cross-section analysis with the new variable on human capital 
shows that the results are qualitatively in line with Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil s work. The panel 
data approach results instead in a very different outcome: the human capital variable becomes 
insignificant or takes the wrong sign, like in the case when a cross-country regression is run without 
adjustments for human capital. 
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One of the reasons for the discrepancies between the predictions of the theory and the empirical 
results is that enrolment is not a suitable approximation for human capital: it is rather a measure of 
the investment in human capital and anyway it does not account for actual differences in quality. 
Furthermore, for the less developed countries the enrolment rates tend to grow very fast since the 
1960s, when big efforts were made to increase the literacy rate of the population. However, the 
real levels of human capital did not rise so much; this temporal effect introduced with pooled data 
results in a negative relationship between human capital and output growth that overcomes the 
positive effect of education in the cross-section framework. 
Secondly, Islam points out the necessity to improve the specification of the production function in 
its human capital variable in the direction of the Benhabib and Spiegel s approach (1994), where 
human capital has a direct influence on productivity, or in line with the endogenous growth model 
pioneered by Romer (1989). Sure enough, in his analysis Islam finds that there may be no direct 
relationship between human capital and growth, as explained by the production function with 
human capital as an input. On the contrary, human capital may somehow influence the variable 
technological change and therefore indirectly impact on the output growth. 
The soundness of this latter intuition is proved in Benhabib and Spiegel (1991). Covering the period 
1960-1985, they run an OLS cross-country regression modelling the production function with 
alternative explanatory variables for human capital and accounting for political instability and initial 
wealth. They find that once physical capital is properly represented in the regression, human 
capital accumulation rates may not add much and their explanation for this result is that human 
capital helps attracting physical capital, thus it works as an indirect input in the production function. 
Similarly, political instability affects the quality of the economic environment, therefore making a 
country more or less attractive for new flows of physical capital.   
1.2 The theoretical framework: an overview of the models of endogenous 
growth 
The failure in finding a positive effect of human capital on growth when it is treated as an input in 
the production function, has induced scholars to seriously consider the models of endogenous 
growth pioneered by Lucas (1988) and P. Romer (1986). The intuition that more educated workers 
may introduce new technologies in the economy, or use them easily and that they adapt faster to 
changes seems sound: thus, education helps attracting physical capital or it leads to growth through 
higher productivity. 
In his early works, Romer (1986, 1989) departs from the framework of the Solow model and builds 
a model with increasing returns to scale for all the inputs. The long-run growth is primarily driven 
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by the variable new knowledge, a non-rival good that is a product of research expenditure of the 
firms and generates positive externalities, since it cannot be perfectly kept secret or patented 
(partially excludable good). In turn, the research technology exhibits diminishing returns to scale. 
Since technological change is (at least in part) the result of the decisions taken by profit-maximizing 
agents, then it may be considered endogenous. 
The general formulation for the output of firm j is:  
(4) Yj = A(R) F(Kj, Rj, Lj)   
where L and K are the labour and physical capital inputs, R represents the research expenditure of 
the firms and A is the endogenous, non-rival new knowledge as a function of the aggregate stock of 
research expenditure. 
Romer (1989) points out that growth accounting exercises call for rates of change of all inputs, 
included human capital, whereas it is the level of the human capital variables that may explain the 
rate of growth of output; in fact, investments play a role in the growth of output and are in turn 
explained by the change in human capital. Such predictions are supported by the empirical results of 
OLS regressions on a data set covering the period 1960-1985, where human capital is measured 
alternatively by literacy, consumption of newsprint per capita and number of radios per capita. 
Although literacy is often considered a bad measure for human capital, Romer s choice is due partly 
to the fact that it is easily available for a large set of countries and more comparable than other 
measures of education. The most important reason however is that the level of literacy is easily 
measured at any time, and this allows to emphasize the different impact of levels and rates of 
growth.  
Lucas (1988) outlines the foundations for a model of endogenous growth and international trade, 
where human capital may be accumulated either through schooling and on-the-job training, or 
learning-by-doing, as two extreme cases: thus human capital is just the skill level of each worker 
and it is assumed that each worker s productivity increases proportionally with the acquired skill 
level. Human capital has also an external effect, since it improves the productivity of all the inputs 
in the production function:  
(5) Yj = A(H) F(Kj, Hj, Lj)  , 
where Kj is the physical capital, Hj is the human capital, Lj is labour at firm level and A is the level 
of technology as a function of the aggregate stock of human capital. 
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This model does not depart very much from Romer s, except for a different definition given to 
human capital. Moreover, in a free trade framework, with mobility of workers allowed, the model is 
also consistent with the observed flows of migration from poor to rich countries, that is from 
countries with lower levels of human capital to countries with higher levels, since in the latter 
environment people are more productive. 
A comparison of the results obtained with growth accounting and the endogenous growth approach 
is offered in the work by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), where they examine the alternative channels 
through which education may affect growth: as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), they model a 
Cobb-Douglas production function where human capital enters an input like physical capital and 
labour, finding an insignificant and usually negative effect of human capital on growth. In a further 
step, they adapt the Nelson and Phelps model (1966) to account for the catch-up of technology to 
the technology of the leading country.  
Nelson and Phelps are critical about the interpretation of education as a mere input in the production 
function; they suggest instead that education speeds the process of technological diffusion , a 
concept further developed by Romer (1986). In other words, they model a world where there exist a 
gap between the theoretical level of technology and the level of technology in practice; the speed at 
which the newly discovered technique is applied in practice depends both on the technological gap 
and on the level of educational attainment of the labour force. 
 In both regressions, Benhabib and Spiegel find a positive relationship only between the initial level 
of education and the subsequent productivity growth. Rates of growth for education never enter 
with the expected positive sign and they tend to be insignificant. This is in line with Romer s 
prediction (1989) that the initial level of a variable related to education, such as literacy, does help 
predict the initial level of investment, and indirectly, the rate of growth . 
Finally, they find empirical support to the hypothesis pointed out by Lucas (1990) of why physical 
capital does not flow to poor countries despite their less productive stock of capital should imply a 
higher marginal product. On the contrary, in reality one can see that capital flows exactly in the 
opposite direction, toward richer economies: according to Lucas, what matters is the difference in 
human capital stocks, or the quality of the labour force. Benhabib and Spiegel s results show a 
positive and significant correlation between human capital stocks and physical capital 
accumulation. 
One more critical point in cross-country regressions is the problem of sample selection: since 
schooling displays its effects differently in each country, an OLS regression may result in an 
undetermined relationship between education and growth. 
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Temple (1999) copes with this problem using the same database as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994): 
applying the least trimmed squares technique (Temple, 1998), allows him to progressively eliminate 
up to 14 observations; hence, the OLS regression run with the clean database results in a clear 
evidence of a positive relationship between education and growth. 
Finally, other scholars model the effects of the Government s intervention in education, either in the 
widespread form of public expenditures and under some other incentives, like for example public 
sector employment. All of this points will be treated in the following section. 
1.3 Incentives and the allocation of talent 
The effect of schooling depends on each country s economic environment or, recalling Easterly s 
words1, according to the incentives to education. In other words, if educated people do not expect 
to find suitable jobs for their skills, they will not have any incentive to invest in their future; as a 
result, they will probably attend school only when compulsory and they will not care much about 
the quality of their education.  
People, although talented, are forced to choose low-profile jobs, thus schooling is wasted, or they 
migrate abroad to countries where more advanced technologies are adopted and therefore there is a 
demand for educated workers. To this end, recall the model by Nelson and Phelps (1966), where 
education is the engine of technological progress and the returns to education are positive only 
when technology is always improving; Lucas s model itself (1988), with human capital exhibiting 
external effects, is consistent with flows of migrations from the poorer to the richer countries.  
Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1991) deal with the problem of the allocation of talents and the 
implications for growth: they assume that high talented people choose occupations with increasing 
returns to ability, where the returns on being the best (or a superstar ) are the highest. According to 
the different economic environment, they may become an entrepreneur, who hires less talented 
workers and introduces new technologies in its business sector. Alternatively, they may become 
rent-seekers, joining the army, the government bureaucracy, working in the sector of law or 
financial services.  
Of course, in reality the difference between the two kinds of jobs is not so sharp. However what 
matters in the model is that entrepreneurship can positively influence economic growth, while rent-
seeking jobs simply redistribute incomes and may affect growth negatively. This latter jobs become 
attractive either when the rent-seeking sectors are powerful and big, hence they deal with a large 
amount of resources, and when they allow for unofficial activities like briberies. 
It is often suggested that the public sector, with its powerful bureaucracy and little public 
accountability, is detrimental both for economic growth and for private incomes and fair wealth 
                                                
1
 William Easterly: The elusive quest for growth. Page 82. 
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distribution, particularly in the less developed countries. For example, Gelb, Knight and Sabot 
(1991) support the hypothesis that surplus labour in the public sector, rather than international trade 
policies, may explain why some developing countries have yet not succeeded in growing fast. They 
list a number of countries where the behaviour of the public sector in the field of employment is 
subject to political pressures: India, Turkey, Indonesia, or where the government is explicitly 
committed in hiring high-skilled workers: Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Egypt. 
The most direct way for a government to play a role in human capital accumulation is to provide 
funds for education. In fact, in many countries education is mostly financed by government 
spending, especially at primary and secondary level. Therefore, scholars have formalized the link 
between public education expenditures and economic growth in models of endogenous growth 
where public spending in education affects growth through human capital accumulation.  
Once again, empirical evidence is ambiguous: Blankenau and Simpson (2004) claim that the direct 
effect of public expenditures on human capital accumulation may be diminished or even overcome 
by the general equilibrium adjustments of other inputs to human capital. In their model, the size of 
the general equilibrium adjustments depends mainly on the level of expenditures and the method of 
finance. Blankenau and Simpson then show that with low levels of expenditures the direct effect is 
dominating, while with higher levels of expenditures it is the method of finance that determines the 
size of the crowding-out effect: in particular, additional expenditures lead to an increase in growth 
when they are financed with a tax on consumption. 
In conclusion, the statement that human capital accumulation has a positive impact on economic 
growth is often not supported by the empirical evidence; such a disappointing result induced 
Pritchett (2001) to ask where all the education has gone. Three possible explanations are offered in 
his paper, acknowledging that the impact of education on growth varies across countries: the first 
one is that at least a part of the high-skilled workers have been hired in socially unproductive, 
although individually remunerative, activities, as discussed before. The second reason is that the 
demand of educated workers did not expand as rapidly as the supply. Finally, the quality of 
education may be so low that it does not actually drive to an increase in productivity; in this latter 
situation, education plays a role in signalling to employers some characteristics like, for example, 
ambition. 
In this paper I will follow Pritchett s intuition that education may have different effects in different 
countries, and I will first analyse the consequences of an impressive investment in education like 
the schooling programme launched in Egypt in the mid-1950s. The purpose is to assess the macro 
effects of the schooling programme applying the economic models available at present, rather than 
to test the general validity of a theory. 
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However, in order to better appreciate the results, the Egyptian case will then be compared with the 
experiences of similar countries in a panel regression framework: Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and 
Syria.  
The purpose of this paper is not to give an opinion on the schooling programme launched in Egypt, 
but rather to analyze it exclusively from the economic point of view. 
In the following section I will outline the main characteristics of the Egyptian schooling 
programme; in section 1.5 I will describe the data available for the time series regression and the 
econometric model; section 1.6 presents the results for the Egyptian case. Section 1.7 and 1.8 are 
dedicated, respectively, to the description of the panel data and the econometric model and to the 
analysis of the results after comparison. 
1.4 The Egyptian education system  
It is universally acknowledged that education is a basic human right that should be granted to all the 
individuals, independently of their social status or economic conditions. This is particularly true if 
one refers to the basic skills given by elementary education: writing, reading and arithmetic, with all 
the implications for the individuals social life. 
It is also well known that schooling has beneficial effects on the quality of life and is a determinant 
of health care choices. 
All the Egyptian rulers have perceived the importance of education and have invested in it a 
significant share of the public budget, already in the first part of the twentieth century2. Compulsory 
primary education was established already in 1923. In spite of this, the literacy rates at mid-century 
were still disappointing. According to Issawi3, the expenditures on education rose from 1% to 12% 
between the First World War and 1950. Nevertheless, the 1937 census showed that 82% of the 
individuals over 5 years was illiterate, after ten years the percentage had declined to 77%, while in 
1957-58 the results of a survey indicated a rate of 72%. There were remarkable differences between 
towns and villages and between men and women, with villages and women being the most 
disadvantaged categories. Finally, the enrolment rate and attendance were also very low: in fact in 
1952 only 45% of the children at elementary school age attended school. 
The men who ruled Egypt since 1952 believed that free universal education, together with other 
social and economic reforms, could be the right way to democracy4. In 1950, as a Minister of 
                                                
2
 For a review of the most important reforms in the Egyptian education system see Harby and El-Hadi Affifi, 1958. 
3
 C. Issawi. Egypt in Revolution. Page 91. 
4 Gamal Abdel-Nasser believed that through such programmes as agrarian reform, industrialisation, the Aswan High 
Dam, free universal education, universal health insurance etc., we could set the necessary groundwork for the building 
of democracy. Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, issue 151/2000; Mohamed Haikel interviewed by Hosny Guindy and Hani 
Shukrallah. Special Supplement  Liberating Nasser's legacy. 
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Education, the Egyptian writer Taha Hussein5 provided free education for all the students at the 
secondary level, while free primary education was granted since 1944. The law in 1956 reformed 
the education system and organized it in four steps: Primay (6 years), Preparatory (3 years), 
Secondary general or vocational (3 years)  and Higher education (3 years). A few years later, 
President Nasser embarked in a programme of school construction throughout the country, in order 
to realize in concrete terms the purpose of increasing the enrolment rate and the literacy rate.  
At that time, the number of schools was clearly insufficient to hold the huge number of students, 
even with two or three shifts a day. Data from the Ministry of Education show that in the time 
period 1951-52 to 1955-56 the number of students at the primary education level expanded from 
1,000,000 to 1,860,000, corresponding to a growth of 86%, while the number of schools increased 
from 5,654 to 8,366 corresponding to a growth of only 46%. With such numbers, the Government 
was forced to plan at first in terms of quantity rather than quality.  
A special fund was established since 1954-55, in order to finance school construction: according to 
a World Bank report6, for the year 1954-55 only, the budget of the fund was fixed at LE 4.82 
million ($13.8 million in 1955).  
The following Table 1.1 shows the significant increase in the number of classes and of students 
over the time period 1953/54 1969/70. The figures are my elaboration from data of the Egyptian 
Ministry of Education. The growth rate of the number of classes is little less than the growth rate of 
the number of students enrolled at the primary level, where the Government effort was probably 
higher, but seems too low at the secondary level. In both cases, the students per class ratio 
deteriorates. In general the female students took the greatest advantage from the Government 
schooling programme and its incentives to enrolment: despite their number is always lower than 
male students in absolute terms, the growth rate is actually remarkable, especially at the secondary 
level.   
                                                
5 Taha Hussein (1889-1973) has been the most important modern arab writer. He used to say that Education is like the 
air we breathe and the water we drink . 
6
 The World Bank, 1955. The economic development of Egypt. Page 23 and 26. 
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Table 1.1  Number of classes, number of  students enrolled at the primary and secondary level of education, and 
students per class ratio, for selected years.    
PRIMARY   
Years Classes Increase (%) Students: 
male Increase (%) 
Students: 
female Increase (%) 
Students 
per class 
1953-54 35,461  872,074  527,095   
1958-59 59,965 69.1% 1,442,400 65.4% 873,718 65.8% 39 
1963-64 73,727 23.0% 1,941,737 34.6% 1,240,461 42.0% 43 
1968-69 82,313 11.6% 2,141,962 10.3% 1,353,806 9.1% 42 
1953-69  132.1%  145.6%  156.8%  
 
SECONDARY   
Years Classes Increase (%) Students: 
male Increase (%) 
Students: 
female Increase (%) 
Students 
per class 
1953-54 13,874  385,850  100,275   
1958-59 15,984 15.2% 358,493 -7.1% 115,004 14.7% 30 
1963-64 21,846 36.7% 522,239 45.7% 206,341 79.4% 33 
1968-69 32,787 50.1% 824,861 57.9% 369,169 78.9% 36 
1953-69  136.3%  113.8%  268.2%  
              
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Education   
Table 1.2  Population and attainment by age group in 1976.  
age-group population no schooling first level second level post-second level 
 
incomplete entered entered 
Read and write Primary Primary and Preparatory Secondary complete
15-19 3,901,918 57.80% 37.10% 5.10% 0.00% 
  20-24 (*) 3,003,384 66.20% 10.10% 21.30% 2.40% 
         25-34 (**) 4,726,235 77.90% 6.30% 10.20% 5.50% 
35-44 3,877,335 86.80% 4.70% 5.10% 3.40% 
45-54 2,944,076 91.30% 4.00% 2.70% 2.00% 
55-64 1,828,053 92.70% 3.20% 2.60% 1.50% 
65+ 1,266,041 95.40% 1.70% 1.90% 0.90% 
   
20-24 (*) Earlier age-group involved in the schooling program 
25-34 (**) Earlier age-group involved in the policy of guaranteed employment in the public sector 
Source: UNESCO. Statistics of educational attainment and illiteracy 1970-1980.  
The first results of the schooling programme are shown in Table 1.2. 
For the age group 20-24, including the first cohorts involved in the schooling programme,  the 
percentage of no schooling declines significantly with respect to the age group 35-44, excluded 
from the program for age reasons. The age-group 15-19 performs even better, either in terms of the 
percentage of no schooling and in terms of first level incomplete: an additional 27% of the pupils 
attended primary school, in comparison with the earlier group. 
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The percentage of second-level entered is not significant for the age-group 15-19, since the 
youngest cohorts may not have yet completed the preparatory school, due to repetitions. 
Finally, it is noteworthy the increase in the percentage of entrants at the post-secondary level among 
the students of the age-group 25-34, who finished the secondary school in the years when the policy 
of guaranteed employment in the public sector was introduced.  
Thus, the Government achieved his goal of universal education from the quantitative point of view, 
granting the presence of buildings throughout the country, but quality would be the challenge for 
the following decades. 
If one regards the students per class ratio as similar to the pupil/teacher ratio, and considers it as a 
proxy for quality, it is possible to compare the data provided by the UNESCO for different 
countries in 1970: at the primary level, Egypt has a pupil/teacher ratio of 38, not very different from 
to the ratio scored by other Arab countries, like Tunisia (47), Jordan (39), Syria (37), Morocco (35), 
but very far from the results of some developed countries like France (23), United Kingdom (25), 
Japan (26).  
In the 1980s, the three main problems affecting the Egyptian education system were related to 
quality: big classes and shifts, the shortage of (trained) teachers and low wages, that have driven to 
a fast growth of the market for private lessons, and the use of outdated textbooks and old teaching 
methods, that induce students to memorize rather than develop personal concepts and ideas (Hansen 
and Radwan, 1982; Harik, 1998). 
Besides the elementary level, that was compulsory, the Egyptian Government also greatly expanded 
access to higher education. Not only it abolished fees for higher education institutions in 1963, but 
it also introduced a strong incentive to attend secondary schools and universities through guaranteed 
public employment for all university graduates (since 1961-62) and for the graduates of vocational 
secondary schools and technical institutes (since 1964). 
At first, this measure had the effect of absorbing educated young men and women, that otherwise 
may have been unemployed, but as the number of graduates rapidly increased in the following 
years, the commitment became unsustainable for the public budget. In their 1982 report on the 
employment opportunities in Egypt, Hansen and Radwan called for a wage reform to solve the 
problem of overstaffing in the public sector and reduce the over-expansion of the education 
system s highest level. 
In the 1980s the Egyptian government established a policy to reduce the rate of growth in the 
number of university graduates in favour of the secondary vocational level or the postsecondary 
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technical institutes7 and modified the law on public employment increasing the waiting period for a 
government appointment up to thirteen years. The aim was to change the composition of the 
graduates and to shift their preferences toward the private sector. In fact, between 1983 and 1991 
the share of university graduates declined from 33% to 27% and the share of vocational secondary 
school graduates increased from 59% to 63%. However, when the government attempted to remove 
from the registry the graduates who had obtained a job in the private sector, they reacted with a 
mass resignation from these firms, indicating how valuable the public employment still is (Assaad, 
1997). Indeed, it is not only a matter of social status. The average weekly wages in the public sector 
are at least in line with, and in many cases higher than, the average of the private sector 
corresponding economic activity. According to the CAPMAS Statistical Yearbook 2008, the 
average weekly wage in the public sector was LE 171 in 2001 and LE 303 in 2006, with an increase 
of about 77%, while in the private sector the average weekly wage amounted to LE 138 in 2001 and 
LE 172 in 2006, with an increase of a mere 25%. 
In two sectors only the wages in the private sector were higher: brokerage (LE 327 for the public 
sector and LE 465 in the private one in 2006; and mining, LE 337 in the public sector and LE 650 in 
the private one).  
Figure 1.1 below shows the structure of the education system adopted in Egypt. 
Figure 1.1  Modern Egypt s education structure.   
Source: Dr. Mohsen Elmahdy Said, An Overview of the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP).  
                                                
7 In Egypt the natural path to university was to attend a general secondary school. Graduates from vocational secondary 
institutes only had access to postsecondary institutes or to a limited range of university faculties. Access to university 
was driven by the score obtained in the secondary school final exam. 
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In conclusion, the schooling programme had the effect of improving the literacy rate and the 
average number of years of schooling at the elementary level. An increasing number of students 
chose to attend school at the secondary or tertiary level, in this certainly stimulated by the 
guaranteed public employment policy. 
In more recent years, Egypt was supported by the World Bank in a reform of the higher education 
system. 
The first phase of the project (Engineering and Technical Education Project, ETEP) that lasted from 
1989 to 1998, was focused on the technical faculties: the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) 
established two new technical colleges for the graduation of technical education teachers and 
provided all the faculties of engineering with labs and workshops to improve their performance. 
In the next four years, from 1998 to 2002, the MoHE coordinated a number of studies to set up a 
comprehensive methodology and determine the guiding principles for the reform of the higher 
education system as a whole. 
The final phase, called Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP) aimed at creating a 
positive environment to improve the quality and efficiency of the higher education system in Egypt 
through legislative reform, organizational restructuring, the creation of tools for quality assurance, 
and the establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems .8 The reform is mainly focused on 
improving the quality of teaching, in order to provide the students with the skills required in a 
modern job market and to overcome the limits of the present teaching methods already stressed in 
Hansen and Radwan ( 1982). 
Table 1.3 allows to have a glance on the progresses made by some Arab countries belonging to the 
same geographical area ad Egypt. It is interesting to see how some countries like Syria had good 
results already in the 1970s  in terms of primary completion rate (56.2%) and school enrolment 
(82.0% for primary and 36.0% for secondary level) although the public spending on education was 
quite low - only 9.3% of total government expenditures if compared with 23.2% of Tunisia and 
about 16.0% of Egypt and Morocco. 
However, the latter countries improved their indices significantly over the next decades, increasing 
dramatically the primary completion rate (now near 100%) and the secondary school enrolment 
ratio. 
                                                
8 Further details on the programme developed with the World Bank are available at the official website 
www.heep.edu.eg 
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Table 1.3  Indices on education for some MENA countries in selected years.   
Primary 
completion 
rate 
Primary 
school 
enrollment 
(gross) 
Secondary 
school 
enrollment 
(gross) 
Public spending 
on education (% 
gov.expend.) 
Pupil/teacher 
ratio, primary 
Pupil/teacher 
ratio, 
secondary 
 
1971 2007 1971 2007 1971 2007 1970 2006 1971 2007 1971 2004 
Egypt 52.9 98.5 67.9 104.7 28.5 87.8 15.8 12.6 38.0 27.1 24.4 17.1 
Morocco 28.4 83.4 51.5 107.2 12.6 55.8 16.6 26.1 34.7 27.4 20.4 18.7 
Tunisia 55.3 99.9 100.4 104.7 22.7 88.0 23.2 20.5 47.5 18.2 27.7 17.6 
Jordan 101.8 102.1 95.7 46.4 89.3 9.3 38.8 19.9 23.0 17.9 
Syria 56.2 114.3 82.0 126.2 36.0 72.1 9.4 36.8 25.3 22.1 18.1 
Source: The World Bank  World Development Indicators 2009.  
In some cases, the indices were not available in the same year: Egypt s secondary school enrolment refers to 
2004; Egypt s public spending on education refers to 1971 and 2007 respectively; both pupil-teacher ratios refer 
to 2003 for Jordan and 2002 for Syria.   
In the next section I will focus on the macro effects of the schooling programme, trying to assess 
whether highest levels of attainment positively affected GDP. 
In terms of literacy rates, presented in Table 1.4, progress is clear for both genders, but especially 
for women, as expected. Jordan ranks at the top with a literacy rate of young females at 84.8% 
already in 1979. 
Table 1.4  Literacy rates for some MENA countries in selected years.   
Adult female 
(15+) 
Adult male 
(15+) 
Adult total 
(15+) 
Youth female 
(15-24) 
Youth male 
(15-24) 
Youth total 
(15-24) 
1980s 2000s 1980s 2000s 1980s 2000s 1980s 2000s 1980s 2000s 1980s 2000s
Egypt 31.4 57.8 57.0 74.6 44.4 66.4 54.0 81.8 71.4 87.9 63.3 84.9 
Morocco 17.5 43.2 43.7 68.7 30.3 55.6 31.0 66.5 58.1 83.8 44.1 75.1 
Tunisia 35.8 65.3 60.4 83.4 48.2 74.3 62.5 92.2 85.7 96.4 74.3 94.3 
Jordan 52.1 87.0 80.5 95.2 66.8 91.1 84.8 99.0 95.8 98.9 90.5 99.0 
Syria 37.1 76.5 73.6 89.7 55.7 83.1 59.0 92.0 88.8 95.4 74.3 93.7 
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators 2009.  The literacy rate is the percentage of people 
who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life . 
Since the indices are not available in the same years, the heading of the columns indicating the years mean 
around 1980 and around 2000 respectively.  
1.5 Model, data and results  
In this paper the effects of schooling on GDP are estimated starting with an aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function, specified by the three input factors labour Lt, physical capital Kt, and 
human capital Ht and improved by the level of technology At, not differently from Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994), Krueger and Lindhal (2001), and Mankiw et al (1992):  
(6) trttt HLKAY
To avoid multicollinearity between capital and labour, the output and the capital stock are 
standardised by labour units. In logarithmic form, the production function can be estimated as  
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(7) ttttt hkAy loglogloglog ,  
where yt and kt represent the output per worker and capital per worker respectively, ht is the average 
human capital and t is the error term. 
Since we are dealing with time series, we have to account for possible unit roots that are usually 
contained in macroeconomic time series and that are likely to deliver spurious results. We have 
conducted the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) and the KPSS test to check for unit roots on the 
levels of the variables. The problem is usually overcome by first differencing.  
The results of the tests are presented in Table 1.5, showing the presence of unit roots in the levels of 
the variables. The time series goes from 1960 to 2007, delivering 46 observations.   
Table 1.5  ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots and AIC and BIC tests for lag length. 
Levels Levels 
Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat AIC BIC 
log_gdp -1.50 2.16 -136.59 (1) -132.89 (1) 
log capital -1.95 1.58 -161.25 (2) -155.76 (2) 
log education -1.79 1.66 -285.03 (2) -279.54 (2) 
log milex/gdp 0.18 2.20 -26.39 (1) -22.69 (1) 
log trade/gdp -2.36 0.26 -11.00 (1) -7.30 (1) 
Lag lengths in parenthesis according to AIC and BIC criteria. 
The McKinnon critical values are -3.58 and -2.93 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant only. 
The KPSS critical values are 0.739 and 0.463 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant only.  
After first differencing the ADF or the KPSS tests prove the variables to be stationary, or  I(1), 
except for the case of education, that instead is I(2). The t-statistics do not improve when the tests 
are run adding a trend. Table 1.6 shows the results of the tests for the variable education in its 
second difference (log diff-diff education). 
Table 1.6  ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots in first differences of the variables.  
With constant only With constant and trend 
Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat 
log difference gdp -4.35 0.16 -4.36 0.08 
log difference capital -2.71 0.92 -3.28 0.10 
log difference education -1.26 1.15 -2.00 0.31 
log diff-diff education -4.28 0.01 -4.34 0.06 
log difference milex/gdp -3.43 0.39 -3.59 0.18 
log difference trade/gdp -3.39 0.08 -3.36 0.08 
McKinnon critical values are -3.58 and -2.93 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant only; -4.17 and 
-3.51 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant and trend. 
KPSS critical values are 0.739 and 0.463 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant only; 0.216 and 
0.146 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant and trend. 
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Since differencing implies the risk of losing the information related to the long-run relationship 
among the variables, recent studies (Nehru and Dhareshwar, 1994 for cross-country studies; 
Loening, 2004 and Morales, 1998 for time series) make use of the error-correction approach. This 
model combines the long-run information expressed in the levels of the variables (error correction 
term) with the short-run adjustment mechanism expressed in the first differences:  
(8) 
ttttt
ttttt
Ahky
hhkky
11115
143121
loglogloglog
logloglogloglog 
However, if we use the variable education in its first differences we will obtain biased results, 
because the error correction model requires stationarity for all the variables in the short run term. 
Alternatively, we could introduce the second difference of the variable education in the short run 
part of the model, and the first difference in the long run term.  
Though, this would make the interpretation of the coefficients more difficult. Sure enough, the log 
difference of a variable has the economic meaning of percent change, while the second difference 
represents acceleration, that is hard to interpret in the case of education. 
For this reason, we have split the database into two sub-periods: from 1960 to 1985 and from 1986 
to 2007. In the mid-1980s Egypt introduced deep reforms that in a direct or indirect way affected 
school: they established compulsory education at the preparatory level (the law was set up in 1981), 
they reformed the law that granted a job in the public sector to the graduates of secondary and 
tertiary level of education and tried to address the choices of the students towards vocational or 
technical institutes. All these reforms have been discussed in Section 1.2. 
The results of the KPSS test in Table 1.7 confirm that the sub-periods allow us to work with 
stationary variables in their first differences.   
 24
Table 1.7  ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots in sub-period 1 and sub-period 2.  
With constant only: levels 
Sub-period 1: 1960 - 1985 
With constant only: levels 
Sub-period 2: 1986 - 2007 Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat 
log gdp -0.81 1.30 -0.42 0.74 
log capital -0.29 1.32 -2.39 0.97 
log education 1.00 0.95 -1.58 0.83 
With constant only: first differences 
Sub-period 1: 1960 - 1985 
With constant only: first differences 
Sub-period 2: 1986 - 2007 Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat 
log difference gdp -3.28 0.07 -3.70 0.33 
log difference capital -2.29 0.12 -2.59 0.24 
log difference education -1.55 0.50 0.65 0.63 
McKinnon critical values are -3.75 and -3.00 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant only. 
KPSS critical values are 0.739 and 0.463 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with constant only.  
The dataset uses data from the IMF International Financial Statistics 2009, the World Bank s World 
Development Indicators 2009 and the Barro and Lee statistics on education available on line. The 
data refer to the time period 1960 2007 and are expressed in Egyptian pound. The ratio military 
expenditures to GDP has been kindly provided by Aamer Abu Qarn.  
Further details on the database are given in the Appendix. 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show the results of a simple production function for sub-period 1 and sub-period 
2 respectively, with the technology level proxied by a constant and a series of dummies. The 
following Table 1.10 contains the results for a model where the technology level is proxied by 
measures of trade and military expenditures. 
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Table 1.8  Production function for Egypt, sub-period 1: technology as a function of dummy variables. 
Dependent variable: percent change of gdp per worker 
Sub  period 1:1960 - 1985 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
         
constant 2.613 ** 2.828 ** 2.290 * 1.512  
(2.348)  (2.335)  (2.068)  (1.61)  
percent change of capital per worker 0.882 *** 1.025 *** 0.940 *** 1.024 ***
(5.84)  (8.854)  (6.312)  (6.387)  
percent change of capital per worker (-1) 0.043  0.128  0.088  0.119  
(0.223)  (0.696)  (0.438)  (0.707)  
percent change of human capital 0.803 *** 1.485 *** 0.899 *** 0.487  
(2.987)  (4.156)  (3.63)  (1.36)  
percent change of human capital (-1) 0.925 * 0.626  1.006 ** 2.675 ** 
(2.061)  (1.381)  (2.196)  (2.912)  
log capital per worker (-1) 0.372 ** 0.343 ** 0.493 ** 0.522 ***
(2.279)  (2.798)  (2.412)  (3.279)  
log schooling (-1) -0.003  0.093  -0.06  -0.03  
(-0.027)  (1.006)  (-0.571)  (-0.317)  
log gdp per worker (-1) -0.676 *** -0.674 *** -0.77 *** -0.72 ***
(-3.527)  (-3.688)  (-3.551)  (-4.396)  
step dummy infitah 1975   -0.078 ***
(-3.354)      
impulse dummy oil 1973-74     0.033    
(1.533)    
step dummy break 1977       -0.127 * 
(-2.13)  
long-run elasticity of capital 0.550  0.510  0.642  0.724  
 
long-run elasticity of schooling -0.004  0.137  -0.084  -0.041  
Adjusted R-squared 0.780  0.822  0.785  0.808  
F-statistic 145.383  205.503  315.650  439.104  
Durbin-Watson 1.754  1.916   1.621   1.700   
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Table 1.9  Production function for Egypt, sub-period 2: technology as a function of dummy variables. 
Dependent variable: percent change of gdp per worker 
Sub  period 2:1986 - 2007 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Model 5   Model 6   Model 7   Model 8   
         
constant 3.065  6.286 *** 2.574  6.277 ***
(1.749)  (3.667)  (1.449)  (3.525)   
percent change of capital per worker 0.937 ** 0.904 ** 1.176 *** 1.310 ***
(2.776)  (2.363)  (3.449)  (4.014)   
percent change of capital per worker (-1) 0.359  0.416  0.385  0.476  
(1.232)  (1.321)  (1.456)  (1.707)   
percent change of human capital -1.656  0.422  -2.436  -0.387   
(-0.885)  (0.230)  (-1.028)  (-0.209)   
percent change of human capital (-1) 1.026  2.360  0.608  1.983   
(0.540)  (1.35)  (0.328)  (1.14)   
log capital per worker (-1) 0.110  -0.202  0.192  -0.143   
(0.795)  (-1.301)  (1.079)  (-0.951)   
log schooling (-1) 0.455 *** 0.80 *** 0.422 *** 0.827 ***
(4.989)  (8.42)  (4.839)  (9.232)   
log gdp per worker (-1) -0.503 *** -0.55 *** -0.534 *** -0.615 ***
(-3.678)  (-5.256)  (-3.355)  (-6.055)   
step dummy WTO 1995   -0.052 *** -0.065 ***
(-4.536)    (-6.109)   
impulse dummy Gulf war 1990-91     -0.021  -0.036   
(-0.783)  (-1.49)   
long-run elasticity of capital 0.219  -0.369  0.359  -0.232  
 
long-run elasticity of schooling 0.905  1.451  0.789  1.346  
Adjusted R-squared 0.525  0.577  0.507  0.608  
F-statistic 49.204  62.524  133.1539  133.069  
Durbin-Watson 2.938  3.071  2.937  3.214  
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Table 1.10  Production function for Egypt, sub-periods 1 and 2 with measures of trade and military 
expenditures. 
Dependent variable: percent change of gdp per worker 
Sub  period 1:1960 - 1985 Sub  period 2:1986 - 2007 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Model A   Model B   Model C   Model D   
         
constant 3.098 ** 2.428 ** -2.480  2.625  
(2.397)  (2.309)  (-0.718)  (1.392)  
percent change of capital per worker 0.974 *** 0.916 *** 1.121 *** 0.980 ***
(7.514)  (6.399)  (3.627)  (3.246)  
percent change of capital per worker (-1) 0.192  0.145  -0.022  0.345  
(1.012)  (0.753)  (-0.0787)  (1.523)  
percent change of human capital 0.970 ** 0.445  -0.010  -2.143  
(2.608)  (1.162)  (-0.005)  (-0.9731)  
percent change of human capital (-1) 0.900  1.232 ** 1.273  1.895  
(1.626)  (2.157)  (0.738)  (0.736)  
log capital per worker (-1) 0.445 *** 0.494 ** 0.644 * 0.257  
(3.462)  (2.908)  (1.888)  (1.15)  
log schooling (-1) 0.019  -0.040  0.425 *** 0.59 ** 
(0.2127)  (-0.4)  (4.808)  (2.85)  
log gdp per worker (-1) -0.788 *** -0.779 *** -0.543 *** -0.63 ** 
(-3.800)  (-4.103)  (-3.847)  (-2.549)  
log trade / GDP (-1) -0.053 *   0.045    
(-1.865)    (1.583)    
log milex / GDP (-1)   0.027    0.043  
(1.738)    (0.981)  
long-run elasticity of capital 0.565  0.635  1.185  0.408  
long-run elasticity of schooling 0.024  -0.051  0.782  0.942  
Adjusted R-squared 0.804  0.794  0.532  0.505  
F-statistic 489.644  374.6273  25.581  103.193  
Durbin-Watson 2.191  1.893  3.072  2.703  
Table 1.8 shows different versions of the error correction model, with a selection of dummies that 
should account for significant events in the recent history of Egypt. 
The step dummy Infitah 1975 accounts for the effects of the new policy of international openness 
introduced by President Sadat since 1974. Contrary to his predecessor, Sadat allowed foreign 
capitals to enter the country, lowered or abolished duties, created free zones in order to attract 
foreign investors. However, all commentators agree that the economic effects of this policy were 
modest or even negative. The larger amount of money circulating in the country did not boost 
productivity and did not drive to faster economic growth. On the contrary, social inequalities 
improved so much  that a new generation of enriched and corrupt fat cats 9 emerged. In fact, the 
dummy is significant and has a negative sign. 
                                                
9 See K. Beattie, Egypt during the Sadat years , page 151, also cited in M. Campanini, Storia dell Egitto 
contemporaneo , page 216. 
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The impulse dummy Oil 1973-74 is related to the oil crises that affected the world economies in the 
early 1970s and, as expected, had a negative impact on Egypt as well. 
The step dummy Break 1977 models a structural change in the relationship of the variables, 
observables in the graphs in the Appendix. A Chow test does not reject the null hypothesis of a 
structural break in 1977 (p-value = 0,000). 
The 1977 dummy is a proxy for the unmeasured social instability that affected the country since the 
1970s and that occasionally expressed violent protests, as happened just in 1977 when the 
population demonstrated against the increase in the prices of basic goods. 
Going to the econometric results, in Model 1 and Model 3 the short run coefficient for physical 
capital varies between 0.882 and 0.94, meaning that a one percent change in stock of capital leads to 
a change in GDP growth of around 0.9, while the long run coefficient lies at about 0.6. The results 
are not far from the coefficients obtained by Loening (2004) for Guatemala and Morales (1998) for 
El Salvador (0.87 and 0.86 respectively in the short run and 0.444 and 0.49 for the long run 
elasticity of capital). 
The short term effect of the average years of education is instead quite too high (between 0.803 and 
0.899), considering that education is not expected to have short-term effects on growth. Comparing 
again the results with Loening (2004) and Morales (1998) we find that in the case of Guatemala the 
log-difference of education was dropped because not significant, while for El Salvador the 
coefficient was significant although very low (0.138).  
The reason for a positive coefficient may lay in the expectations for future better economic 
circumstances. Increasing average years of education may be due to higher enrolment rates in the 
primary grades, that happened in the early 1950s, and higher enrolment rates in the upper grades 
happened in the second half of the 1960s (see Table 1 in Part 1 on the Egyptian education system). 
Higher enrolment ratios in the secondary level of education, boosted by the law on the public sector 
jobs, could be read as a proxy for improved expectations. 
In Models 2 and 4, the short run coefficients for physical and human capital are outliers, therefore 
we consider that the dummies do not help to improve the model specification. 
In fact, since the impulse dummy for the oil crises introduced in Model 3 is statistically not 
significant, we can conclude that the plain model without dummies represents the best 
specification for sub-period 1. 
The results do not change significantly in Models A and B (Table 1.10), where the dummies are 
replaced by measures of trade and military expenditures, often used as proxies of technological 
progress. Again, these Models still show very high coefficients for human capital: 0.97 in Model A 
and 0.445 in Model B. 
 29
The coefficient for the long term elasticity of education has a different sign in Model 1, Model 3, 
Model A and Model b, but the coefficient is everywhere close to zero, meaning that, in the long run, 
schooling did not have the  positive and noteworthy effect suggested by the growth model. A 
reasonable explanation could be that the public sector absorbed all better educated people. 
Moving to Table 1.9, the dummies capture the permanent effect of the joining to WTO that 
happened in 1995 and the transitional effects of the Gulf War in the early 1990s. 
Surprisingly, the dummy WTO has a negative sign, but the coefficient is very close to zero, thus the 
effect is negligible and the same argument holds for the dummy Gulf War which however has the 
expected negative sign. 
In Model 5 and Model 6 the percent change of the capital per worker, at around 0.9, is close to the 
coefficients of the first sub-period. In Model 7 and Model 8, the introduction of the dummy Gulf 
War makes the coefficients far too high (1.176 and 1.310), therefore we consider that the dummy 
does not help to improve the model specification. The results do not change in Model C and Model 
D in Table 10, where the dummies are replaced by measures of trade and military expenditures. 
The long run elasticity of capital is very unstable in signs, in particular it seems that the dummy 
WTO turns the signs into negative in Models 6 and 8. 
As regards human capital, the short-run coefficients are highly unstable as well, either in the sign 
and in the magnitude and we consider the coefficients of Models 5 and 7 as outliers. The long run 
coefficients are all positive, ranging from 0.789 to 1.451. 
In conclusion, Model 7 seems to be the best specified model for the second sub-period, with a 
positive long run coefficients for physical capital (0.359) and for human capital (0.789). human 
capital in particular might have benefited of the reforms of the law on the public sector jobs and of 
the schooling system. 
However, the short run coefficients are quite puzzling (1.176 for physical capital and -2.436 for 
human capital). If the argument of expectations holds, the negative short-run effect of human capital 
may incorporate the outcome of the reforms in the public sector jobs. Instead, the structural reforms 
applied since 1991 with the assistance of the IMF may have affected the short-run equilibrium10. In 
fact, the introduction of a step dummy accounting for such reforms does not improve the 
coefficients, perhaps because the widespread effects cannot be easily captured. 
The results in Table 1.10 (Models C and D) do not help to find the best specified model, because at 
least one of the coefficients is an outlier and the variability of the coefficients prevents from 
comparing directly the models in Table 1.10 with the ones in Table 1.9. 
                                                
10 The joint Egypt-IMF/WB stabilisation programme (ERSAP, Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Programme) can be summarised in three main points: reduction of the fiscal deficit, currency and financial system 
reforms, poverty alleviation policies. 
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Attempts to introduce data on migrations to improve the model were fruitless. As is evident in 
Figure 1.3, an increasing number of Egyptian migrated abroad since the mid-1960s. Most of them 
were high educated people leaving towards other Arab countries, thus depriving the country of the 
beneficial effects of the investments in education. However, this variable does not change the 
results significantly, neither used in substitution nor in combination with other dummy variables.   
Explanations for this could be that the number of migrants was already accounted for in the data on 
human capital, since data on population come from census or surveys that should only number the 
residents in the country (Barro and Lee, 2000). Moreover, the data on GDP and capital stock have 
been normalised by the units of workforce, thus excluding migrants.  
Figure 1.3  Net migration in Egypt. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
The paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of the improvement in the average years of 
education in Egypt. 
In order to obtain unbiased results, the error-correction model has been applied to two sub-periods, 
where all the variables proved to be stationary in their first differences. 
The signs and the coefficients of the long run elasticity of schooling in sub-period 1 seem to tell that 
the first reforms of the schooling system did not affect much the economic growth. Such a reform 
involved the students in their early years of education, aiming at improving the literacy rate of the 
population, and this may have not been enough to have a significant impact on the GDP growth. 
Although the law that granted a job to the secondary school and university graduates boosted 
attendance to higher levels of education, the allocation of the jobs was almost entirely in the public 
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sector. Again, this sector is usually poor of technological development, that should be the engine to 
growth, according to the economic model. 
In the 1980s the public employment policy changed and in the 1990s the Government succeeded in 
shifting the enrolments towards vocational secondary schools, in order to meet the employment 
needs of the private sector.  In 1981 the Government introduced compulsory education at the 
preparatory level  
All these circumstances whose effects are included in the second sub-period, may have determined 
the change in the sign of the long run coefficient of education, showing the positive effect of the 
change in the quality of human capital. 
This suggests that in the long-term the investments in education had a positive effect on economic 
growth. The 1960s schooling programme, with the strong increase in the number of students 
enrolled in the earlier years of education, paved the way for a further enhancement obtained with 
the 1981 Law on preparatory education and all this helped to increase the measure of the average 
years of schooling in the following decades. 
The Government s guarantee of a job in the public sector proved to be unsustainable in the long run, 
however, it represented a real chance to improve the living standards also for poor people. Sure 
enough, enrolment in the secondary schools and university was merely related to the results 
obtained in the final exams, while attendance was free of taxes and for the poorest students the 
books were free as well. 
It must be recognized that the Egyptian rulers achieved the goal of improving the living standards of 
the population and one of the means was certainly the right of access to basic education. Free access 
to superior education and the incentive of a job in the public sector could have helped many 
Egyptians to come out from poverty.  
An econometric analysis on private incomes could be the way to quantify the effects of the policy.  
Appendix to Part 1  
The Egyptian main source of data is CAPMAS (Centre for Public Mobilisation and Statistics) and 
some series are also available in the internet, however it has not been possible to build a long time 
series of homogeneous data. Therefore, all data used in the paper come from the International 
Institutions databases. 
Gdp 
The IMF International Financial Statistics 2009 provided the data on GDP in Egyptian pound (LE). 
Values in current prices have been transformed in constant 2005 prices using the CPI index, also 
available in the IMF-IFS statistics and divided by the number of the workforce. 
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The GDP in US dollar (US$) come from the WB World Development Indicators dataset, that 
provided data in current prices, then transformed in constant 2005 prices using the CPI index.  
Figure 1.A  The percent growth in GDP per worker. 
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Figure 1.B  Evolution of GDP and capital. 
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Capital 
The time series on fixed investments was compiled using the IMF-IFS 2009 Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation for the data in current LE (then transformed in constant 2005 prices using the CPI index) 
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and using the WDI database for the data in current US$ (then transformed in constant 2005 prices 
using the CPI index). 
Although it has some limits and problems, the Perpetual Inventory Method is the most common 
way to estimate capital stock. In this formulation the stock of capital at time t is the accumulation of 
the flows of past investments, accounting for depreciation. 
When building a time series on the stock of capital, one has to deal with two main issues: the initial 
capital stock and the depreciation rate. 
In this paper, the initial capital stock (K) has been derived using the capital/output ratio (c) from 
Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) database:   
ttt YcK
An alternative equation to estimate the initial capital is  
gIK tt /1
where It+1  is the flow of investments at time t+1 (gross fixed capital formation) and g is the rate of 
growth of GDP at time t. The assumption is that the growth rates of GDP and capital are equal in a 
given period, thus the capital  output ratio is constant over that period. 
Since the two methods did not drive to significant differences, the initial capital from Nehru and 
Dhareshwar has been used in all the time series. 
The second issue to deal with is the depreciation rate of capital, whose choice affects the estimates 
much more than the initial capital. In this paper, the depreciation rate is assumed to be 5 percent, in 
line with other studies on emerging countries like Turkey (Ackabelen, 2009) that belongs to the 
same geo-political area as Egypt, and Guatemala (Loening, 2004) that experienced internal conflicts 
and social instability, not differently from Egypt (wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973, Middle East 
conflict in 1990-91, protests since the end of 1970s). 
The path of the capital-output ratio since the end of the 1970s can be explained with a boom of 
investments in infrastructures. After decades of neglect, when Egypt s resources were mostly 
employed to expand the military power, the end of the war with Israel allowed the Government to 
invest in infrastructures and rebuild the country.       
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Figure 1.C  The capital  output ratio in Egypt. 
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Labour force 
Data on the labour force are obtained from the ILO Labour Statistics Database (LABORSTA), 
whose sources are the population census and labour force surveys. Missing values usually involve 
not more than a couple of years, but in the period 1960  1973 only two censuses and a survey were 
available, thus leading to missing values for five or six consecutive years.  
Due to a lack of alternative data, the missing values have been filled with a linear interpolation 
approach, although six years of missing data is quite a long period. Since 1993 a comparison with 
data from the Central Bank of Egypt and CAPMAS shows that the LABORSTA data are in line 
with original Egyptian figures. 
Alternatively, the labour force (Lt) has been computed using the Penn World Tables 6.3 (2009): 
t
wok
tt
cap
t yPopyL /
where ycapt and ywokt represent GDP per capita and per worker at time t respectively, and Pop is the 
population. 
Figure 6 shows the path of the labour force with alternative sources of data. The series from ILO 
and computed Penn World Tables overlap almost perfectly until the 1990s. Thereafter, ILO follows 
the trend of CAPMAS. 
In the model we have used the workforce provided by the ILO, however, since either the capital 
stock and the GDP are standardised by labour units, the final effect of the choice is negligible.    
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Figure 1.D  The labour force time series: a comparison of  sources.  
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Human Capital 
In this paper we have used the attainment levels of the workforce as a proxy for human capital. It is 
widely recognised that there not exist a complete measure of human capital, since it includes a large 
set of qualities. However, the attainment levels are preferred to alternative measures since they 
embody the output of schooling. The enrolment rates, often used instead, represent the investment 
in schooling or, in other words, the potential human capital. 
The two datasets on human capital most commonly used in recent studies are Barro and Lee (2010) 
and Cohen and Soto (2001). The only limit of these sources is that data are available in 5 or 10 
years intervals, and therefore a linear interpolation approach is needed in order to obtain a time 
series. 
Barro and Lee have recently updated the original database extending the period observed, that now 
covers the years between 1950 and 2010. Figure 1.E shows the differences of the two time series, 
related to the population aged 15 and over. 
In the regression models the regressor for education comes from the Barro-Lee database since they 
are available at shorter time intervals.          
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Figure 1.E  Average years of schooling of the Egyptian labour force aged 15 +. 
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Part 2 The effects of opening to international trade: 
the case of Egypt   
Summary 
The debate on whether it is exports that support growth or a minimum level of growth is needed to boost exports is still 
open. The results of empirical works are contradictory and widely depend on the choice of the econometric approach. In 
this work we study the causal relationship between exports and GDP for the Egyptian economy. We apply the standard 
Johansen and Juselius cointegration test and a VECM for cointegrated variable. The Luetkepohl methodology allowing 
for structural breaks is also implemented. We detect causality from GDP to exports, thus finding support for the 
Growth-led Export hypothesis. 
2.1 The economic theory on PTAs  
Since Adam Smith s The Wealth of Nations, many scholars claimed that trade liberalisation could 
lead to fastest economic growth. Among these, the empirical researches by Dollar (1992), Sachs 
and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1998), seemed to support the hypothesis, although they were later 
criticised by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for the use of misleading indicators of openness. 
Also the international organisations like The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
support this view, particularly with regards to the developing countries. Rodrik (2006) summarises 
a list of ten essential reforms recommended by the international organisations to reach an acceptable 
level of economic development: fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, tax reforms, 
financial liberalisation, unified and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, openness to 
FDI, privatisation, deregulation, secure property rights. And these are exactly the steps followed by 
the IMF in supporting the reorganisation of the Egyptian economy. 
In the latest two decades, however, preferential trade agreements (PTA) were signed in such a huge 
number that Bhagwati (1995) labelled this trend as the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. 
While some economists and many policymaker think that bilateral agreements are an alternative 
way to reach the goal of a world free of tariffs and barriers to trade, Bhagwati and other skeptics 
underline the confusion of innumerable applicable tariff rates depending on the origin of the goods. 
And the rule of origin is itself arbitrarily determined by the members of the agreement and may 
vary by products or by agreement: for example, Bhagwati notes that the EU applies different rules 
of origin with different non-EU countries. 
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Moreover, preferential trade agreements seem to have negative short-term effects, as Viner stated 
for the first time in 1950: trade creation among the partners and trade diversion with non-partners. 
In particular, if outside producers are more efficient, this will result in a general loss of efficiency11. 
Taking this into account, economists have tried to find solutions to avoid trade diversion in a PTA. 
Successful PTAs should be signed only among countries with the following characteristics, the so-
called natural trading partners : geographic proximity or alternatively low transport costs; a high 
initial volume of trade; similar development stage; a large number of countries involved, in order to 
increase the opportunities for specialization. The concept of natural trading partner was first 
developed by Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), and then emphasised by Krugman (1991) and Summers 
(1991). 
In fact, Bhagwati and Panagariya showed in their works that at least the first two criteria rest on 
error, although [their] appeal is intuitive to many . Panagariya (1997) proved that, unless transport 
costs completely eliminate trade between two countries, they have to be treated as any other cost. 
Thus, it is the marginal cost of import that is relevant to explain welfare gains or losses, and not the 
average cost, as stated, for example in Krugman (1991). 
In the same paper, Panagariya referred to a previous work (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996) to 
show that welfare gains on a PTA individual member come from the tariff revenue effects rather 
than from trade creation or trade diversion, unless the agreement is followed by a redistribution of 
income from the low-tariff to the high-tariff country. He gave as an example just the PTA between 
the high-tariff North African countries and the EU, where the former are likely to suffer static 
welfare losses . 
As regards the stage of development, Bhagwati and others (1998) illustrated how PTAs proliferate 
among the developing countries, in most of the cases due to political and bureaucratic pressures 
rather than to economic incentives. 
In the long-run view the question to be addressed is whether there are incentives to add members to 
a PTA, thus reaching multilateral free trade. Baldwin (1993) proposes a model that works in the 
case of endogenously-determined time path and where the time path of the PTA is separate from the 
path of the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). Baldwin shows that there is a positive incentive 
to join for the non-member countries at the margin of the preferential trade area. Firms in those 
countries experience lower profits because of the trade barriers they face and therefore they lobby 
for entry. Countries at the next margin will then occur in the same situation, until a worldwide free 
trade area is created. 
                                                
11 Lawrence, R.: Preferential trading arrangements: the traditional and the new . 
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On the other hand, if the PTA and the multilateral trade negotiations time paths interact, the 
bilateral agreement can reduce or remove the incentives toward a multilateral liberalisation (see 
Krishna, 1998 and Levy, 1994). Albertin (2008) further shows that once a preferential trade 
agreement is in place, firms lobby to protect their preferential market access, thus leaving the 
policymaker without the right incentives to move toward further liberalisation. 
In the specific case of the Euro-Med Agreement, Nsouli (1996) finds an additional negative effect 
for the Southern Mediterranean countries: the so-called hub-spoke effect, due to the lasting high 
intraregional trade barriers among these countries. Instead of investing in one of the South 
Mediterranean countries because of the new liberalisation policy, foreign investors could prefer to 
establish themselves in the EU (the hub ) thus profiting by the access to all the Southern countries 
at the same time (the spokes ). 
The issue is related to the South-South trade, a concern for many economists. It is known that on 
average goods traded among developing countries face much higher tariffs than in North-North 
trade or even North-South trade. Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) report a table where average 
manufacturing tariffs faced by developing countries exporting to other developing countries is 
12.8%, but it is only 3.4% for exports towards developed countries. Therefore, developing countries 
could obtain considerable gains from liberalisation of South-South trade. Moreover, preferential 
agreements between developing countries should probably focus more strictly on trade issues and 
would be free of political conditionality often imposed by developed countries. 
Again, Stiglitz and Charlton propose a framework called Market Access Proposal that should 
allow developing countries to gain the benefits of liberalisation and to minimise the adjustment 
costs. Indeed, trade agreements have high costs of implementation and it is often difficult for these 
countries to reconcile their commitments with other development issues. This is one of the reasons 
why developing countries are often excluded by the world trading system. 
According to the Market Access Proposal, all WTO members should guarantee free market access 
to all countries poorer and smaller than themselves, scaled with regards to GPD and GDP per 
capita. 
Finally, a study by Hoekman and Djankov of the World Bank (1996) compares the MENA 
countries with the countries of Eastern Europe, that also signed trade agreements with the EU. Both 
groups of countries started reforms in the late 1980s, the level of state intervention in the economy 
was high, they are geographically close to the EU.  
Opening to Europe brought significant benefits to the Eastern European countries (EEC), especially 
looking at the so-called outward processing trade: the EU countries exported components and 
imported back the processed good, providing also the know-how in terms of designs or monitor 
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quality. A similar process may be implemented also for the MENA countries, since they share with 
the EEC a low cost of labour and an adequate level of technology and the agreements allow 
transfers to poorer countries in the form of technical assistance. 
Moreover, the agreement signed with the EU, helped many Eastern European countries to 
implement other economic reforms, also in the view of a future membership of the EU, which in 
fact happened in 2004 and 2007. 
Membership is out of question, at the moment, for MENA countries. However, the strong 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism in the Euro-Med agreements can give credibility to the 
reform process and more specifically to the commitment to liberalise trade. 
According to Bhagwati and others (1998), the European Council of Ministers has taken into account 
the concerns expressed by some economists regarding the proliferation of PTAs and has resolved to 
limit new preferential agreements when a strong case can be made, satisfying several criteria . 
In the next sections we will analyse the case of Egypt, that experienced either openness to 
international trade and import-substitution policies. These phases are described in Section 2.2 to 
Section 2.6, emphasizing the recent economic relationship with the EU. 
From Section 2.7 we provide an econometric approach to assess the effects of trade on the Egyptian 
economy, with regards to total trade and to trade with the EU. Section 2.11 concludes. 
2.2 The open economy in Egypt between 19th and 20th century  
The policy of opening to international trade that began in Egypt in the 1990s is not a new 
experience for this country12. 
Already in the second half of the nineteenth century, under Mohammed Ali s successors, Egypt 
experienced the integration with the world economy through the export of a primary commodity 
such as cotton. 
In that period, the cotton imported into England from the southern states of America represented 
about 80% of the raw material required to supply the English cotton industry. 
In 1861, as the American Civil War broke out, the southern states of America suddenly stopped the 
exports of cotton towards Europe, thus triggering a deep crises known as the Lancashire Cotton 
Famine (1861-1865). Great Britain tried to diversify her supplying sources supporting the 
cultivation of cotton in areas like British India and Egypt.  
Since raw cotton prices rose from 6½ pence in 1861 to 27½ pence in 1864, Egypt had a strong 
incentive to specialise in the production and export of cotton, although at the expense of food 
                                                
12 For deeper details about the economic history of Egypt see C. Issawi: Egypt in Revolution; and R. Mabro: The 
Egyptian economy, 1952-72.  
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production. Important investments in the fields of agriculture, namely in irrigation, transports, 
banking and finance (the city of Alexandria hosted the futures market) supported the development 
of the new industry. 
The production of cotton rose from 501,000 cantars13 in 1860 to 2,140,000 in 1965 and reached 
7,664,000 in 191314. 
Unfortunately, nothing had been done in order to diversify the economy, nor the Government 
attempted to improve the quality of human capital through new investments in education. These 
could have helped the country in the following decades when the one-crop export-oriented economy 
would have shown its limits. 
The growth in per capita income either for the upper and middle class and for the mass population 
was strictly related to the positive trend of the export-led economy, but the conditions for a 
sustainable growth were not met. 
After the first decade of the twentieth century, the economic situation deteriorated: the soil was 
damaged by excessive exploitation due to multiple cropping and perennial irrigation, while a late 
introduction of fertilizers, improved seeds and drainage did not bring benefits until the 1930s. In 
fact, the great part of the investments done in agriculture in this period were used to repair the 
damages more than to improve productivity and therefore yearly output growth barely reached 1%. 
Moreover, the international economy was in dire straits after the two World Wars and the Great 
Depression, and the price of cotton suffered large fluctuations15. The terms of trade became 
unfavourable. Wages started to decline. The service of the high public debt became unsustainable. 
Under all these circumstances, either internal and external, Egypt was not able to persist in her 
attempt to reach sustainable economic development through openness to international trade. Soon 
after the World War II, Egypt still was an agrarian country with marked inequalities in the 
distribution of income. Industry, finance and services were in the hands of foreigners.  
2.3 The decades after the World War II. 
Although cotton still represented 70-80% of the value of exports in the 1950s, the data for the 
following decade show an interesting trend toward diversification. In 1969/70, rice, textiles and 
other manufacturing corresponded to the 11,5%, 14,3% and 15,5% of exports, at the expense of raw 
cotton that dropped to 49%16. 
                                                
13 The cantar is a traditional Arabic unit of weight that corresponds to about 45 kg. (F. Cardarelli. Encyclopaedia of 
scientific units, weights and measures. Springer, 2003). 
14
 Data in this chapter are from C. Issawi. Egypt in Revolution. Oxford University Press, 1963. Page 27. 
15 Between 1947 and 1950 cotton prices ranged between $ 30 and $ 100 per cantar. (Issawi, Egypt in Revolution. Page 
221).  
16
 Mabro, The Egyptian economy, 1952-72. Page 180. 
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On the other side, imports have always been more diversified, although their composition changed 
throughout the years, according to the different needs of the country. In the 1930s textiles accounted 
for about 25% of total imports, and foodstuff for about 20%, half of this consisting of cereals. In the 
following decades, the process of industrialization had to be supported with increasing imports of 
petroleum (from 4% of total imports in 1950 to 11% in 1960), machineries and spare parts (from 
8% to 17%). And the growing population asked for rising quantities of foodstuff, mainly cereals, 
thus making Egypt one of the world s main importers of wheat. 
The Revolutionary regime that came to power in 1952 tried to eliminate from the economy all 
distortions and imbalances. In a few years, the Government applied an import-substitution 
industrialisation and put all economic activities under public control or under strict regulation: 
Egypt had to be self-sufficient in the production of all what was needed. The country closed to 
foreign business, regardless of whether it may have benefited the economy, except for the activity 
of oil exploration. 
A financial crisis that hit Egypt in around 1964 and the 1967 War negatively affected the Egyptian 
economy, that went through a period of stagnation. The lack of investment capital and spare parts 
had a bad impact on the development of industry. Moreover, the country heavily relied on foreign 
imports of foodstuff.  
In the years after the July Revolution, the public sector expanded rapidly. In 1963, the financial 
sector (insurance companies and banks) was fully owned by the state, that also controlled almost all 
international trade and 80% of the means of production17 
In 1974 president Sadat launched the policy known as infitah (the open door), that consisted in 
relaxing the tight control on some economic sectors such as tourism, finance and constructions. A 
tax holiday was established to incentive foreign investments in Egypt.  
In spite of official invitations to invest in Egypt, little was done to effectively make the country 
attractive. The Government continued to manage the economy with heavy interventions in the 
productive process, subsidies to companies, full control of trade and of foreign exchange. 
In summary, the public sector expanded its size in the late 1970s. Public employment rose at a 
yearly rate of 3,7% and the public sector s share of GDP grew from 45,1% in the mid-Seventies to 
53,6% by 197918. 
2.4 The late 1980s: The ERSAP and the economic reforms. 
In the mid-1980s, the Egyptian Government recognized that the reforms were urgent, in order to 
support the country s sustainable economic development. 
                                                
17 Iliya Harik. Economic policy reform in Egypt. Page 19, citing Nasser. 
18
 Iliya Harik. Economic policy reform in Egypt. Page 20. 
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Structural reforms were introduced since the fiscal year 1990/91, with the assistance of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which stated in a later report: by the standards of 
recent experience with economic stabilization, Egypt in the 1990s is a remarkable success story .19 
The main problems affecting the Egyptian economy were an excessive intervention of the State, as 
already remarked in the previous section; a heavy burden of debt service due to a high level of 
public debt (the central government deficit amounted to over 20% of GPD); an inflation rate at 
around 20%. 
The first steps of the joint Egypt-IMF/WB stabilisation programme (the so-called ERSAP, 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme) can be summarised in three main points: 
1. reduction of the fiscal deficit, either on the revenue side (introduction of a general 
sales tax and adjustment of the exchange rate, which boosted the revenues from the Suez 
Canal and the oil company profits, both under Government control) and on the expenditure 
side (cuts in the capital investment budget and removal of untargeted subsidies); 
2. currency and financial system reform: unification of the different foreign 
exchange markets and introduction of auctions for the sale of Treasury Bills; the exchange 
rate was pegged to the U.S. dollar and the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) committed to an 
active policy on the monetary markets. The active policy of the CBE helped to increase the 
liquidity in the monetary market and to put inflation under control; 
3. poverty alleviation policies: a Social Fund for Development was created, in order to 
reduce the short-term impact of the cuts to subsidies and protect the most vulnerable groups. 
The Fund supported micro enterprises, provided basic community services, hired workers in 
labour-intensive public works and improved the monitoring of living standards. 
These reforms not only allowed the economic stabilization of the country, but also would be the 
foundations for the subsequent opening to international trade and financial flows. 
In 1998, at the time of IMF s report, Egypt had already taken a number of trade reforms, thus 
reducing the burden on trade: reduction of tariffs, lowering the highest rate from 120% to 70%; 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports; elimination of non-tariff barriers on exports. 
Egypt also lifted the restrictions on private imports and exports of cotton. 
In spite of this, according to the IMF, at the end of the 1990s Egypt s trade system still remained 
quite restrictive. A maximum tariff rate of 70% was judged too high, import surcharges between 2% 
and 5% were still applied to all imports and some import bans had been replaced by restrictive 
quality controls.  
                                                
19
 Egypt beyond stabilization, toward a dynamic market economy. IMF, 1998. Page 1. 
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In 1981 the country had joined the PAFTA (Pan Arab Free Trade Area)20, whose aim was the 
elimination of all customs duties and other fees on merchandise by 2005, and all non-tariff barriers. 
Preferential treatment was granted to the least developed member states, who could enjoy free 
market access in all member states, meanwhile they had to reduce their customs tariffs gradually in 
five instalments since 2005.  
Egypt also signed other agreements for the establishment of free trade zones with her neighbours: 
AGADIR, with other Arab Mediterranean countries (Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco), signed in 2004 for 
the establishment of a free trade area in 2005; the 2005 FTA with Turkey, still in process; 
COMESA, a preferential trade agreement for the establishment of a Common Market for East and 
South Africa. 
Finally, in 2001 Egypt signed a PTA with the European Union, for the establishment of a free trade 
area originally by 2010. 
2.5 The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. 
The European Union s policy of cooperation with and assistance to her counterparts in the southern 
bank of the Mediterranean Sea springs in the Cooperation Agreements negotiated during 1975-77. 
The Mediterranean countries were granted duty-free access to the EU market for industrial goods. 
Agricultural products were excluded. Financial aid was provided by five-year Financial Protocols, 
which established the amount of resources to be delivered to each partner country. In the years 
1978-91, the EU and the European Investment Bank delivered ECU 3.3 billion to the Southern 
Mediterranean Countries21. 
From the EU point of view, the Mediterranean countries under analysis are not an important market. 
Figure 2.1 shows the share of trade between the EU1522 and some selected southern Mediterranean 
countries, computed as the sum of imports from and exports to these countries divided by the 
amount of the trade with the world. After two peaks in 1960 and 1980, since 1990 the share is not 
able to reach 1% with exports from the EU slightly prevailing on imports (see Figure 2.2 and 2.3). 
In the last two decades, all countries have kept their shares constant. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt 
are the main trade partner among the countries in the area. 
                                                
20 PAFTA Member States are: Egypt United Arab Emirates (UAE) Bahrain Jordon Tunisia Saudi Arabia
Sudan  Syria  Iraq  Oman  Palestine  Qatar  Kuwait  Lebanon  Libya  Morocco  Yemen. 
21 Nsouli, Saleh and others: The EU s new Mediterranean Strategy . Page 14. 
22 OECD data are not available for the EU27. However, the results do not change substantially since Egypt s main 
European trading partners belong to the EU15. 
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Figure 2.1  Shares of trade between the EU15 and selected Med-countries.  
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Figure 2.2  Shares of EU15 import from selected Med-countries.  
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Figure 2.3  Shares of EU15 export toward selected Med-countries.  
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In more recent times, the EU launched the so-called Barcelona Process23, whose aim is to establish 
a common area of peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean region and therefore 
goes well beyond trade. 
From the economic point of view, one important goal was to create a free trade area in the 
Mediterranean region by 2010. In this new framework, the EU signed bilateral agreements with 
each of the southern Mediterranean countries, except Libya that did not join the Partnership, Turkey 
that signed a customs union, and Syria that is still negotiating her agreement.  
The first agreement was signed with Tunisia in July 1995 and entered into force in March 1998. It 
has been the landmark for all the following deals, including the one with Egypt, which was signed 
in June 2001 and entered into force in June 2004. 
Article 1 states the main objectives of the agreement:  
- development of close political relations between the EU and Egypt; 
- progressive liberalization of trade in goods, services and capital; 
- promoting balanced economic and social relations between the EU and Egypt; 
- fostering the economic and social development of Egypt; 
- consolidating peaceful co-existence and economic and political stability; 
- encouraging cooperation in all areas of mutual interest. 
It is only with Article 6 that the document starts dealing with trade issues, thus confirming that 
more commitments other than free trade are required to the parties in order to fulfil the agreement. 
Finally, the EU agreements also deal with financial transfers towards Egypt, not only supporting 
project financing but also providing resources to modernise the economy and to help reducing the 
negative effects of trade liberalisation.  
2.6 Trade between Egypt and the EU in the 2000s. 
As of 2008, Egypt s main European trading partners were Italy, Germany, Spain, and France. 
However, the value of trade with Egypt was negligible if compared with other countries like China 
or the United States. The yearbook on external and intra-European Union trade shows that in 2008 
China, the US and Russia represented 40% of total EU-27 imports and 33% of exports24.  
Egypt ranked 24th and 36th respectively among the importers from and exporters to the EU-27, 
improving the 2003 ranking where it was placed 29th and 37th. 
In fact, in 2008 the amount of goods imported by Italy from the US was tenfold the imports from 
Egypt and the proportion for exports was four to one. Similar data hold for the other Egypt s 
                                                
23 More precisely, we are referring to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, that was launched at a Euro-Mediterranean 
Foreign Ministers meeting in Barcelona in November 1995. 
24
  External and intra-EU trade - statistical yearbook. Data 1958-2008. 
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European trade partners, as shown in Table 2.1. All countries except Spain are net exporters to 
Egypt. 
Table 2.1  Amounts traded by Egypt s main European partners as of December 2008.   
PARTNER COUNTRY 
Import  / 1,000,000 Export  / 1,000,000 
Egypt China United States Egypt China United States 
Italy 2,247.14 23,600.12 11,798.03 2,905.57 6,444.26 23,038.14 
Germany 1,063.64 51,461.39 34,360.97 2,718.35 34,036.95 71,081.80 
Spain 1,556.79 17,108.07 9,569.50 664.21 2,131.88 7,486.31 
France 898.25 19,165.13 20,616.85 1,199.50 8,978.72 23,755.13 
UK 752.80 32,705.60 37,441.33 1,148.67 6,106.71 43,239.32 
Source: Eurostat.  
If one considers quantities, however, things change considerably (Table 2.2). All countries except 
UK are net importers from Egypt and the comparison with China and the US is less unfavourable. 
For example, the quantity of goods imported by Italy from the US in 2008 was only twofold the 
imports from Egypt, while the proportion for exports was still four to one. 
Table 2.2  Quantities traded by Egypt s main European partners as of December 2008.   
PARTNER COUNTRY 
Import 100_Kg Export 100_Kg 
Egypt China United States Egypt China United States 
Italy 45,953,543 95,866,045 111,681,764 16,051,531 22,312,389 72,159,168 
Germany 14,778,945 102,792,200 76,891,159 6,975,585 55,377,614 99,027,060 
Spain 41,813,816 91,105,519 110,764,315 4,927,410 18,569,703 49,239,506 
France 18,692,815 45,597,794 80,563,385 9,612,752 16,191,841 54,693,538 
UK 5,606,525 78,185,470 95,606,341 9,985,780 37,349,410 204,304,716 
Source: Eurostat.  
From Egypt s point of view, instead, in 2008 the EU was the main trading partner, representing the 
35% of exports and the 55% of imports, followed by Asia and the Arab countries. As shown in 
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4, trade with all partners is growing at a fast rate in the 2000s, however the 
relative importance of North America is decreasing in the exports.  
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Table 2.3  Amounts traded by Egypt with her main partners for selected years.    
PARTNER 
COUNTRY 
Import $ / 1,000,000 Export $ / 1,000,000 
2004 2007 2008 2004 2007 2008 
EU - 27 3,425 6,209 14,396 2,700 4,703 9,262 
Asia (no Arab c.) 2,196 4,113 12,050 1,112 3,252 4,643 
Arab countries 1,460 4,843 7,437 1,395 2,479 6,684 
North America 1,426 2,745 6,318 639 1,135 1,597 
World 12,838 27,063 52,916 7,676 16,161 26,204 
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry.   
Figure 2.4  Shares of Egypt s import and export with selected countries. 
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In the next part of this section, we will analyse in more details the components of the trade flows 
between Egypt and the EU using the data available in Eurostat. 
As of 2008, the most imported good was Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes , that alone accounted for 45% in value and 66% 
in quantity. Spain and Italy contribute to the total imports of such good with a share of 33% each in 
value and 41% and 29% respectively in quantity. Within this category, Spain and France were 
importers of Natural gas, liquefied , while Italy and Germany imported Petroleum oils . 
After mineral fuels, Fertilizers were mainly imported by France and were the second most 
imported good. However, they were only less than 7% in value and 10% in quantity. A wide range 
of items in the categories Iron and steel , Electrical machinery , Aluminium and articles 
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thereof were also imported but their contribution to the total imports was negligible, at around 3% 
to 5%. 
Yet summing up the categories related to clothing and textiles, they are as much important as 
Fertilizers. In fact, they reached 7.2% in 2008, as is shown in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5  Composition of Egypt s export to EU27.  
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Export toward Egypt was much more variegated: 29% in value came from Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof , of which 43% due to Italy s trade. 
This category has a very wide range of items from Parts of gas turbines and Appliances for 
pipes, boiler shells and the like corresponding to the 16%, to machineries for different industrial 
appliances and household applications. 
At around 10% in value were Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof and 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway . For this last good, Germany counted for 74% with the 
items Motor cars , Special purpose vehicles and Road tractors . 
Though, the leading exported goods in terms of quantities were: Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes (Italy represented 87% of the 
total quantities exported by the five countries, with the items Medium oils and Petroleum oils ); 
Iron and steel (72% came from UK s trade of Waste and scrap of iron and steel ); Cereals 
(91% came from France s trade of Wheat and meslin ). These items corresponded respectively to 
16%, 15.9% and 11.75% of the total. Figure 2.6 shows the details. 
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Figure 2.6  Composition of Egypt s import from EU27.  
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Looking at the previous years, Figure 2.7 shows for all countries a sharp increase in imports from 
Egypt since 2005. Particularly remarkable is the trend for Spain, that, starting from the lower levels 
of Germany and France, almost reached Italy. This performance is entirely due to her imports of 
mineral fuels and oils, that jumped from  96 mln in 2004 to  719 mln in 2005 (20% and 65% of 
imports respectively), and particularly to natural gas, imported for the first time just in 2005. 
Also notable is the behaviour of Greece (not shown in Figure 2.5): in 1996 her imports were at the 
level of UK, well above Germany and Spain. Thereafter, it started a decreasing trend, moving away 
from the top five, because of the falling imports of mineral fuels, not covered by the fast increasing 
imports of iron and steel. 
In general, mineral fuels and oils has always been the most imported good and their importance 
improved in the first half of the 2000s, exactly where the graph shows the increasing trend. 
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Figure 2.7  Trend of the import for Egypt s main European partners.   
Source: Eurostat.  
As regard exports, only Italy and Germany improved their volumes since 2007, more than two years 
after the Agreement came into force ( Figure 2.8). 
In the years running from 1995 to 2008, Germany increased its exports by 2.4 times from  1,137 
mln to  2,725 mln, the leading items being the wide category of nuclear reactors and boilers 
(30% of the total value, constant over the years); vehicles (at around 20% in value, with growth 
rates between 20% and 30% since 2004 and 77% in 2008); electrical machinery and optical and 
photographical appliances .  
In the same time period, Italy performed an increase of total exports of 3.2 times from  909 mln to  
2.909 mln, mainly due to nuclear reactors and boilers (at around 35% of total exports); 
electrical machinery and articles of iron and steel (between 8% and 10% respectively). Mineral 
fuels jumped from  7.6 mln in 1995 to  381,6 mln in 2008, thus becoming since 2006 the second 
most exported good with a share of 13% on the total value. 
For UK s exports, leaving aside the leading item nuclear reactors and boilers , iron and steel 
showed a very significant growth since 1995, from  14.2 mln and a share of 35 of total exports to  
177.8 mln and a share of 15%. 
Finally, what was determinant in the decreasing trend of France s exports since 2006 was the 
category aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof . Indeed, the exports of such good fell sharply after 
a peak in 2005 and was null in 2008.    
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Figure 2.8  Trend of the export for Egypt s main European partners.   
Source: Eurostat.  
The top trade partners already had a consolidated relationship with Egypt. What may be of further 
interest is the behaviour of the eastern European countries (EEC). Some of these countries were 
very close to Egypt in the 1960s, and not only from the economic viewpoint, if one considers the 
number of Egyptian doctoral students sent to these countries. 
Contrary to the case of the countries just analysed, the top five EEC trading partners were all net 
exporters to Egypt in 2008. However, the amounts traded were absolutely negligible if compared 
with the other Egypt s European trading partners. As is evident in Table 2.4, ECC trade was 
particularly addressed towards Germany and Italy, ranging from 55% of Romania s imports to 16% 
of Slovenia s exports.  
Table 2.4  Amounts traded by Egypt s EEC main trading partners as of December 2008.   
PARTNER COUNTRY 
Import  / 1,000,000 Export  / 1,000,000 
Egypt Germany Italy Egypt Germany Italy 
Romania 64.4 9,406.5 6,618.4 185.7 5,532.9 5,217.5 
Hungary 8.2 18,828.3 3,162.2 176.1 19,577.9 3,997.0 
Czech Republic 12.9 29,220.0 3,971.3 160.6 30,483.8 4,620.8 
Poland 29.6 40,550.9 8,932.4 154.0 29,020.6 6,925.8 
Slovenia 9.5 4,318.2 4,159.6 92.4 4,332.0 2,704.1 
Source: Eurostat.  
In the following two graphs (Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10) we analyse the trends of trade between 
Egypt and its main partners among the Eastern European countries, in order to assess whether some 
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significant changes occurred after the 2004 Trade Agreement. Recall that Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia joined the EU in January 2004, and Romania did in January 2007. 
While for the Western European countries the effect of the Agreement should influence only 
exports towards Egypt - since the EU market was already open to the Egyptian goods - the EEC 
countries trade could be affected on both sides: the entry in the EU opened their markets to the 
Egyptian exports and the entry into force of the Trade Agreement allowed exports towards Egypt. 
Although Romania emerged as the main importer in 2008, with Cereals , Pharmaceutical 
products and Mineral fuels and oils , yet the data shows a weaving trend, due to an highly 
irregular import of Mineral fuels and oils. In many years (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2008) data 
are missing as if there were no imports of such good, but in 2006 a sudden jump brought imports of 
such item at 60% of total imports. 
Excluding Romania, the trend for the remaining countries is much more regular, showing an 
interesting increase since 2004, especially evident for Poland. For this country, Plastics and articles 
thereof represented 49% of imports already in1999, but since 2004 new items were added to the 
list of goods imported from Egypt, leaving Plastics with a share of just 12.5% in 2008: Edible 
preparations (15%, achieving 22% if we also consider Edible vegetables ),  Pharmaceutical 
products (6%), Carpets (7%). 
Hungary and Czech Republic s most imported item was cotton while Slovenia increased the 
imports of edible fruit and vegetables and plastic at the expense of cotton. The peak of the Czech 
Republic imports shown in Figure 2.7 for the year 2003 was entirely related to the purchase of 
aeroplanes, that did not happen in the previous or following years.  
Figure 2.9  Trend of the Eastern European Countries import from Egypt.  
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In terms of amounts traded, Romania is Egypt s main Eastern European partner. Similarly to 
imports, Romanian exports relied on a single article, Wood , that represented 30% of exports in 
1999, reaching 41% in 2008. Vehicles and Iron and steel followed with a share of about 11% 
and 7% respectively. 
The impressive trend of Hungarian exports since 2004 was connected to a sharp increase in the 
article Electric machinery, sound reproducers, television image reproducers that multiplied by 
almost eight times in three years and counted for 72% of total exports in 2008. It is interesting to 
see that at H6 level, the growth was initially due to Transmission apparatus for radio and 
television , but in 2005 this item was totally replaced by the new entry Telephones for cellular 
networks Also increasing, although not comparable in the magnitude of the growth, was Nuclear 
reactors and boilers , representing only 14% of exports as second most exported item. 
Poland s exports were supported by Mineral fuels and oils (minimum share of exports 11% in 
2007, maximum share 38% in 2002). Unfortunately, data at H6 level are available only since 2004, 
showing Bituminous coal as leading item until 2006, then replaced by Medium oils . 
Data for the Czech Republic show a growing trend since 2004 for the two leading goods Vehicles 
and Nuclear reactors and boilers . The former multiplied by six times since 1999 and represented 
the 32% of exports in 2008, while the latter showed a twofold increase in the same time period and 
were equivalent of 26% of exports in 2008. 
Figure 2.10  Trend of the Eastern European Countries export to Egypt.  
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After exploring the qualitative composition of Egypt s imports and exports, we propose in the next 
Section an econometric investigation on the causal relationship between trade and GDP and a 
survey of the results of previous empirical works. 
2.7 An econometric analysis of the Egyptian trade: Previous empirical 
evidence25  
The empirical part of this paper we will try to assess whether the Export-led Growth (ELG) 
hypothesis is valid for Egypt. 
From the theoretical point of view, exports expansion can stimulate growth directly as a component 
of aggregate output, or indirectly through a more efficient allocation of resources, the adoption of 
technological improvements to face foreign competition, or economies of scale. The country s 
comparative advantage theory assumes that when the domestic markets are too small, the 
appropriate scale can be achieved with an expansion towards foreign markets.  
Moreover, the foreign exchange deriving from exports allows the import capital goods and 
intermediate goods that raise the growth of capital formation and thus boost the economic growth. 
The studies on pooled data usually support the ELG hypothesis. They are conducted using different 
notions of exports and growth. Particularly, since the results may be spurious due to exports being 
part of GDP, alternative measures of exports are used, for instance real manufactured exports 
earnings (Tyler, 1981) or share of changes in exports in GDP (Feder, 1983). 
Some other works also run a regression on a complete production function, thus considering 
economic fundamentals such as capital, labour and foreign investments (Papanek, 1973; Balassa, 
1978 and 1985). 
Empirical works focused on the causal relationship started in the late 1980s with the application of 
the standard Granger causality test to time series (Jung and Marshall, 1987; Chow, 1987; Dodaro, 
1993), but unfortunately the results were contradictory, even when related to the same country. 
This may be due to the use of different variables or time intervals. However, critics point out that 
the limit in those early works was the arbitrary choice of the lag length and the failure in testing the 
cointegration properties of the variables (Bahmani-Oskooee at al., 1991 and Bahmani-Oskooee 
Alse, 1993). Sure enough, the Granger causality test is valid only if the time series are not 
cointegrated. 
The Bahmani-Oskooee Alse study is also the first work that uses an error-correction model to 
assess causality. Such model allows for the long-run effect that is otherwise neglected when first 
differences are used to correct for non-stationarity. 
                                                
25
 A complete survey of the empirical literature on the ELG and the GLE theory can be found in Giles and Williams, 
2000. 
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Some researches grouped developed and developing countries or focused on geographic proximity, 
analysing South Eastern Asia (Islam, 1998), or North Africa and Middle East (Abu-Qarn, 2001 for 
MENA countries; Alsuwaidi, 1997 for Egypt; Elbeidy, 2010 for Libya), or Latin America (Arnade 
and Vasavada, 1995). The ASEAN countries particularly are considered with great interest since 
they performed impressive economic growth combined with trade openness, thus they are often 
perceived as a good example of export-led growth. Nevertheless, some scholars suggest that this is 
such a particular experience that cannot be interpreted as a general support for the ELG hypothesis 
(Buffie, 1992). 
In recent studies, pretesting for unit roots and cointegration has become standard practice, in 
combination with more advanced econometric techniques, developed to deal specifically with time 
series. In spite of the adoption of standard practices, the results are not in favour of a specific 
theoretical hypothesis. Moreover, the increasing interest in single country case studies seems to 
support the concept that the results of an economic policy are strictly connected with the specific 
conditions of each country. 
Among the studies conducted on Egypt, Alsuwaidi (1997) modeled a VEC on cointegrated 
variables and found support for the Growth-led Export (GLE) hypothesis, while Abustait (2005) 
could not refuse the opposite ELG hypothesis. Abustait applied the standard Granger causality 
approach on cointegrated variables, and chose to divide the original time series (1977-2003) in two 
parts and conducted the analysis on the sub-period 1991-2003. The year of the structural reforms, 
1991, was in fact considered as a break point in the series. Riezman et al (2005) found support for 
the ELG hypothesis only in bivariate analysis, while no causality was detected once including 
imports. 
Abu-Qarn (2001) modelled a VECM for cointegrated variables and a SGC for non cointegrated 
variables and compared the results of some countries in the MENA region. He also worked with the 
variable exports of manufactured goods and controlled for imports, thus assessing positive causality 
from exports to GDP or bidirectional causality for countries with a high share of manufactured 
goods on total exports, like Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. No causality was detected for 
Algeria, Jordan and Egypt. When using total exports though, no causality at all is found for any of 
the countries involved. 
For Lybia, Elbeydi et al (2010) estimate a trivariate VECM on cointegrated GDP, exports and 
exchange rate and found evidence of bidirectional causality between GDP and exports. Since the 
economy of the country heavily rely on oil exports (accounting for 95% of exports and 30% to 40% 
of GDP), the case of Lybia cannot be directly compared with other countries of the same 
geographical area, and in fact it was not included in the AbuQarn s sample. 
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Moving to studies on other countries, the evidence is again mixed, although the econometric 
techniques follow the standard practice: bidirectional causality between exports and GDP for 
Greece (Dritsaki, 2004), evidence of ELG for Mexico in a multivariate approach (Van den Berg and 
Lewer, 2007), for Bangladesh between exports and industrial production (Al Mamun and Nath, 
2005), for Japan, USA, Germany, UK in Marin (1992). Maneschiøld (2008) detected bidirectional 
causality for Argentina and ELG for Brazil. The time series for Mexico presented a break, thus it 
was divided into two sub-periods, with different results: ELG in the pre-break period and 
bidirectional causality in the post-break period. 
In this paper we will apply the customary econometric techniques to assess causality and moreover 
we will account for possible breaks applying the Luetkepohl (2004) approach, that allows to work 
with the complete time series instead of dividing it into sub-periods. 
The next section introduces to the methodology, data and results follow in the further section. 
2.8 Methodology 
A well-established procedure recommends to start testing for the stationarity of all the variables 
before studying the possible cointegration and causal relations (Toda and Phillips, 1993).  
To check for unit roots on the levels of the variables we have conducted the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test (ADF). Moreover, since the ADF test is sensitive to the number of lags and sometimes 
fails in assessing the stationarity of the variables, we have used the KPSS test as well, which tests 
the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
If the variables are stationary in their first differences, or I(1), we can perform the cointegration 
analysis, to assess the long run relationship between the variables. 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), two variables are said to be cointegrated of order one 
CI(1,1) if both are integrated of order one I(1) and there exists a stationary linear combination of the 
two that can be expressed by the following equations: 
(1) ttt exbay 000
(2) ttt eybax 111
  
Although the EG test is widely applied in empirical works, it has been criticised, mainly because its 
two-step estimator allows possible errors from the OLS regression to affect the results of the second 
step. Furthermore, the procedure delivers only one cointegration equation. This is a shortcoming in 
cases with more than two variables, where the long-run relationship among them may be explained 
by more than one equation.  
The Johansen s (1998) maximum likelihood estimator is a valid substitute for the EG procedure. It 
is based on an error correction model that embodies an error term, as expressed in equation (4): 
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(3) tptptttt YYYD 11111 ... 
where Dt contains deterministic terms (constant, trend, dummies),  is the long-run impact matrix 
and the k are the short-run impact matrices. The system expressed in the equation above can 
include more than two variables. Indeed, a trivariate model with a third control variable improves 
the power of the analysis. Such practice is widely applied in recent works with the aim of 
overcoming the limits of previous causality analysis based on bivariate systems (see among others: 
Abu Qarn, 1995, for trade, Loizides, 2004, and Keshtkaran et al., 2012, for government 
expenditures). 
The Johansen s maximum likelihood ( -max) and trace tests determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors r under the null hypothesis that r = r*, the cointegrating rank, against the alternative of r = r* 
+1 for the -max test and of r  r* + 1 for the trace test. 
The step forward is the assessment of a causal relationship between the variables. The results of the 
cointegration analysis influence the choice of the correct model to use. 
If the variables are cointegrated, a VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) should be used, in order 
to account for the long-run relationship. 
If instead no cointegration is detected and the variables are I(1), we could implement a VAR in first 
differences and apply the Standard Granger Causality. Sure enough, the absence of the error 
correction term in the VAR model is not a shortcoming since we are dealing with variables that do 
not have any long term relationship (Toda and Phillips, 1993).  
Unfortunately, the customary F-test and Wald test that determine the joint significance of specific 
variables included in a VAR are not valid for non-stationary processes, since the test statistics do 
not have a standard distribution. 
The procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) allows to implement a modified Wald 
statistics (MWALD) with an asymptotical standard Chi-square distribution. They suggest to 
estimate a VAR (k+dmax), where k is the optimal lag lengths of the system and dmax is the order of 
integration determined with the unit-root test. The optimal lag length, k, is determined according to 
Information Criteria (AIC or BIC). Thus, the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology improves 
the power of the Standard Granger Causality approach and can be applied irrespective of the 
integration or cointegration properties of the variables. As proved in Rambaldi and Doran (1996), 
the MWALD test can be obtained estimating the model as a set of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR). This is the metholodogy followed in this paper for the Granger causality 
analysis. 
In order to further improve the analysis, we have also performed the tests in a framework allowing 
structural breaks. First of all, Perron (1989) showed that if we account for structural breaks the 
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results of a plain unit-root test favourable to the unit-root hypothesis may be reversed in favour of 
the stationarity of the series.  
In this paper we apply Zivot and Andrews (l992) model C testing the unit-root hypothesis in the 
presence of structural breaks at an unknown point in time: 
(4) 
k
j
tjtjttttt ydDTDUycy
1
1
Where DUt is a dummy variable that takes value one for any point in time since the break date TB 
and zero otherwise (DUt = 1 for t > TB, 0 otherwise) and DTt is the corresponding trend shift 
variable, DTt = t - TB for t > TB, 0 otherwise. 
If the variables have the same order of integration, we will then move to the cointegration test, 
again considering the possible impact of structural breaks, and to a VEC model for the cointegrated 
variables. The procedure developed by Luetkepohl et al (2004) is based on the equation 
(5) ttt xdty 10 
Where the vector process yt is generated by a constant 0, a time trend t with its vector of 
coefficients 1 and a dummy variable dt with its vector of coefficients . The dummy variable is 
defined as dt =1 for t and zero otherwise, with  representing the shift point at unknown time. 
For the estimation of the model we adopted the procedure implemented by Pfaff (2008). 
In case of non cointegrated variables, we will estimate a VAR and adopt the Standard Granger 
Causality approach, testing for the presence of structural breaks with the help of the QLR test. 
2.9 Data and results 
We start the analysis of the data with the assessment of a causal relationship between GDP and 
Egyptian world exports. 
All data are from the World Bank WDI from 1965 to 2007 and are expressed in current Egyptian 
pound that incorporate the effects of changes in prices, as in Pomponio (1996). The end date of 
2007 allows us to avoid the effects of the world economic crises that started at the end of 2008. 
The null hypothesis of unit-root is rejected in the first difference for all the variables, suggesting 
that the variables are stationary in their first difference, or I(1). In order to find a possible evidence 
of trends, the unit-root tests are performed either in the case constant only and constant and 
trend , see Tables 2.5 and 2.5a, but no significant difference emerges from the two cases, except for 
l_GDP that cannot be clearly assessed as I(1) in the tests with trend. In Table 2.5a the column 
time shows that this variable is significant only in the tests in levels.  
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Table 2.5  ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots. Case with constant only. 
Levels First Differences 
Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat lags ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat lags 
log_gdp -0.98 1.19 3 -3.16 0.15 5 
log merch_imp 0.22 4.32 0 -5.33 0.11 0 
log merch_exp 0.91 0.84 5 -5.73 0.21 0 
log manuf_imp 0.21 4.28 0 -4.87 0.13 0 
log manuf_exp 0.81 4.29 0 -5.07 0.19 0 
log goser_imp -0.13 2.23 1 -4.68 0.11 0 
log goser_exp 0.16 2.24 1 -3.67 0.09 5 
Source: author s calculations. Lag lengths are determined with the General to Specific method. 
The McKinnon critical values for 40 observations are -3.60 and -2.93 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with 
constant only. The KPSS critical values are 0.739 and 0.463 and 0.347 at the 1 and 5 and 10 percent significant 
level with constant only.  
Table 2.5a  ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots. Case with constant and trend.  
Levels First Differences 
Variables ADF t-
stat KPSS t-stat lags time ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat lags time 
log_gdp -2.99 0.16 3 *** -3.18 0.14 5  
log merch_imp -2.19 0.21 2 ** -5.30 0.11 0  
log merch_exp -2.24 0.20 0 ** -3.70 0.06 4  
log manuf_imp -2.17 0.36 1 ** -4.84 0.14 0  
log manuf_exp -1.87 0.36 0 ** -5.15 0.06 0  
log goser_imp -2.27 0.32 1 ** -4.63 0.12 0  
log goser_exp -3.23 0.10 3 *** -3.62 0.07 5  
Source: author s calculations. Lag lengths are determined with the General to Specific method. 
The McKinnon critical values for 40 observations are -4.20 and -3.53 at the 1 and 5 percent significant level with 
constant and trend.  The KPSS critical values are 0.216 and 0.146 and 0.119 at the 1 and 5 and 10 percent 
significant level with constant and trend.  
With all the variables being non-stationary in their levels and having the same order of integration, 
we can apply the cointegration techniques to assess a possible long-run relationship between GDP 
and exports, following Toda and Phillips (1993). 
The graphical examination of the series involved in the analysis (see Appendix) suggests a linear 
trend in the cointegration relation, thus in the Johansen test procedure we have applied the so-called 
Case 3: Unrestricted constant. Exports are expressed in three different ways: total exports as the 
sum of exports of goods and services (Goser_exp), merchandises (Merch_exp), and manufactured 
goods (Manuf_exp). 
Since we have a few observations, the appropriate number of lags has been determined with the 
estimation of a VAR in levels using the Schwarz Information Criteria (BIC) which in this case is 
more appropriate than Akaike s, and that is two for the variable Goser_exp and one for Merch_exp 
and Manuf_exp. 
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The evidence reported in Table 2.6 assesses cointegration only when imports are included as 
endogenous variable. We obtained similar results with Case 4, Unrestricted constant and restricted 
trend. For sake of completeness we also report the results of Case 2, Restricted constant, (see Tables 
2.A and 2.B respectively, in the Appendix). Although in this latter case we detected cointegration 
also in the bivariate models, we decided to ignore the result, since the application of restrictions on 
the intercept does not seem appropriate given the drift shown by the variables.  
Table 2.6  Johansen cointegration tests. Case 3: Unrestricted constant.        
Cointegration 
vectors 
Hypothesized 
number of 
coint. 
equations 
lambda-
max 
critical 
value trace 
critical 
value rank 
      
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp None 10.1110 15.6700 10.1110 19.9600 0 
At most 1 0.0003 9.2400 0.0003 9.2400   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp None 2.55 15.6700 2.99 19.9600 0 
At most 1 0.44 9.2400 0.44 9.2400   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp None 3.2807 15.6700 3.2974 19.9600 0 
At most 1 0.0167 9.2400 0.0167 9.2400   
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp, 
l_goser_imp None 35.46 22.00 39.52 34.91 1 
At most 1 4.02 15.67 4.06 19.96   
At most 2 0.04 9.24 0.04 9.24   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp, 
l_merch_imp None 30.45 22.00 37.07 34.91 1 
At most 1 5.21 15.67 6.62 19.96   
At most 2 1.41 9.24 1.41 9.24   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp, 
l_manuf_imp None 42.5140 15.6700 48.4690 19.9600 1 
At most 1 5.3635 9.2400 5.9550 9.2400   
At most 2 0.5915 9.24 0.5915 9.24   
The results obtained with the Johansen cointegration test allow us to estimate a Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) to detect a causal relation between the cointegrated variables, while in 
the absence of cointegration, a VAR model in first differences has to be estimated and the standard 
Engle-Granger causality analysis is performed.  
In line with the previous analysis of the data, the VECM has been modelled with Unrestricted 
constant. However, since such option was chosen only under a graphical basis and given that we 
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detected cointegration in the bivariate models of Case 2 (Restricted constant), we have run the 
model also in the alternative cases of restricted constant and unrestricted constant and restricted 
trend . 
A further difficulty in modelling is the choice of the appropriate number of lags. We have 
performed the ECM with an initial time lag of two, that is the minimum lag to allow for the short-
term effects, up to a maximum time lag of four. Table 2.7 shows the results of the VECM procedure 
for the case 3: Unrestricted constant. The results of the other cases can be found in the Appendix, 
Tables 2.C and 2.D. Following Dritsaki at al (2004), the models that better fit the data have been 
selected according to the best combination of the Durbin-Watson test for the residuals 
autocorrelation, the Doornik-Hansen test for the normality of the residuals, and the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (BIC). The appropriate lag length is two in each model.  
According to Granger, a significant error correction term is an indicator of a causality relationship 
from the explanatory variable to the dependent variable. 
However, in the case of multivariate models, like those exposed in Table 2.7, it is impossible to tell 
which of the two explanatory variables determines the causality relationship. 
Since the error correction term is never statistically significant in the models with exports as the 
dependent variable, we can conclude that growth does not promote exports, whatever their 
definition. 
Instead, the models detect causality from exports and imports to GDP, thus supporting the ELG 
hypothesis. The error correction term is always significant and has a negative sign, which suggests a 
long-run adjustment process towards the equilibrium. However, when exports are expressed as 
manufactured goods, the Doornik-Hansen test does support the hypothesis of the normality of the 
residuals only at the 10% percent critical value (p-value = 0.056). Therefore, we should be careful 
in drawing conclusions. 
The error correction term is also significant in the equations with imports as the dependent variable, 
so we can detect a bidirectional relation of causality among the three variables. 
With the differenced variables not significant, we do not find any evidence of short-run causality.  
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Table 2.7  Trivariate VEC model for causality test. Case III Unrestricted constant .        
Export as the sum of Goods and Services 
Independent 
Variables logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logGOSER_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logGOSER_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 0.143 *** -0.039  -0.166 * 
logGDP_1 0.139  0.953 * 1.638 *** 
logGOSER_EXP_1 0.005  0.082  -0.275  
logGOSER_IMP_1 0.020  0.263  0.547 ** 
EC -0.095 *** 0.060  0.226 ** 
BIC -4.646  -4.646  -4.646  
Durbin -Watson 1.970  1.834  1.880  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
48.598 
(0.000)  
48.598 
(0.000)  
48.598 
(0.000)  
      
Export as Merchandises 
Independent 
Variables logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMERCH_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMERCH_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 0.416 *** 0.002  -1.402 *** 
logGDP_1 0.230  0.343  1.910 *** 
logMERCH_EXP_1 0.042  0.058  0.101  
logMERCH_IMP_1 0.014  -0.017  0.312 ** 
EC -0.099 *** 0.030  0.384 *** 
BIC -2.999  -2.999  -2.999  
Durbin -Watson 1.968  1.996  1.843  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
17.957 
(0.006)  
17.957 
(0.006)  
17.957 
(0.006)  
Export as Manufactures 
Independent 
Variables logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMANUF_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMANUF_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 0.782 ** -1.058  -3.302 *** 
logGDP_1 -0.010  0.224  2.448 *** 
logGDP_2 -0.041  0.778  0.474  
logMANUF_EXP_1 0.070 * 0.130  0.041  
logMANUF_EXP_2 -0.030  -0.179  -0.310 *** 
logMANUF_IMP_1 0.006  -0.010  0.553 *** 
logMANUF_IMP_2 0.053  -0.043  0.105  
EC -0.194 ** 0.331  0.903 *** 
BIC -2.500  -2.500  -2.500  
Durbin -Watson 1.931  1.725  1.459  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
12.241 
(0.056)  
12.241 
(0.056)  
12.241 
(0.056)  
Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). EC is the error correction term.   
For the variables that are not integrated according to Johansen, we can apply the Standard Granger 
Causality (SGC) analysis and estimate three bivariate VAR(1) models, with lag lengths determined 
with the Schwarz Information Criteria. 
Yet, given the critics moved to such an approach, we have also adopted the Toda and Yamamoto 
methodology and have run a VAR (k+dmax) model in levels. All the variables are I(1), thus dmax is 
one, while the optimal lag length, k, is chosen according to the Schwarz criterion (BIC) and results 
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to be one for the model with GDP and GOSER_EXP and two for the remaining variables 
MERCH_EXP and MANUF_EXP. 
Therefore, we have run a bivariate VAR(3) in logs with the variables GDP and GOSER_EXP and 
two bivarate VARs(2) in logs for GDP and MERCH_EXP and MANUF_EXP. 
The models are implemented following the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) as in Rambaldi 
and Doran (1996).  
Since we are dealing with data expressed in current values, we have modelled a second series of 
VARs with a time trend, which is significant in almost all regressions although it does not change 
the outcome considerably. The results of the Granger causality test are set out in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 
and 2.9b. 
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Table 2.8  Standard Engle-Granger causality analysis. VAR model in first differences.    
Dependent 
variable: 
dl_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from export to 
gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
dl_GOSER_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to export 
VARIABLES       
Constant 0.069 ***  0.020   
ld_gdp_1 0.451 **  0.713   
ld_goser_exp_1 0.062   0.275 **  
      
R-squared 0.305   0.305   
Durbin-Watson 2.223   2.223   
F-test (1,39) 0.938 (0.339) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 2.531 (0.120) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
Dependent 
variable: 
dl_GDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from export to 
gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
dl_MERCH_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to export 
VARIABLES       
Constant 0.068 ***  0.107   
ld_gdp_1 0.539 ***  0.242   
ld_merch_exp_1 -0.011   0.074   
R-squared 0.288   0.015   
Durbin-Watson 2.302   1.983   
F-test (1,39) 0.031 (0.861) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 0.297 (0.589) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
Dependent 
variable: 
dl_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from exports 
to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
dl_MANUF_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to exports 
VARIABLES       
Constant 0.067 ***  0.177 
***  
ld_gdp_1 0.494 ***  -0.206   
ld_manuf_exp_1 0.042   0.100   
R-squared 0.307   0.008   
Durbin-Watson 2.286   1.731   
F-test (1,39) 0.742 (0.394)  
NO 
CAUSALITY 0.147 (0.703)  
NO 
CAUSALITY 
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Table 2.9  Granger causality test (Toda and Yamamoto approach as implemented by Rambaldi and Doran) 
without trend.  
CASE NO TREND 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GOSER_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
const 0.243   -0.633   
l_gdp_1 1.274 ***  1.220 ***  
l_gdp_2 -0.077   -1.475 **  
l_gdp_3 -0.242   0.490   
l_goser_exp_1 0.082   1.160 ***  
l_goser_exp_2 -0.106   -0.282   
l_goser_exp_3 0.064   -0.101   
      
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.047   
0.236    
MWald test 1.931 (0.587) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 10.433 (0.015) YES 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MERCH_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
const 0.085   -0.353   
l_gdp_1 1.531 ***  0.291   
l_gdp_2 -0.548 ***  -0.166   
l_merch_exp_1 -0.005   1.011 ***  
l_merch_exp_2 0.023   -0.129   
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.018  0.125   
MWald test 0.461 (0.794) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 2.008 (0.366) 
NO 
CAUSALITY
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MANUF_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
const 0.053   -0.973   
l_gdp_1 1.494 ***  -0.231   
l_gdp_2 -0.487 ***  0.418   
l_manuf_exp_1 0.039   1.007 ***  
l_manuf_exp_2 -0.047   -0.173   
Sum of lagged 
coefficients -0.008   0.187   
MWald test 1.337 (0.513) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 3.554 (0.169) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
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Table 2.9b  Granger causality test (Toda and Yamamoto approach as implemented by Rambaldi and Doran) 
with trend. 
CASE WITH 
TREND 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GOSER_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
const 2.167 **  5.376 **  
trend 0.015 **  0.047 ***  
l_gdp_1 1.241 ***  1.117 ***  
l_gdp_2 0.018   -1.176 *  
l_gdp_3 -0.382 **  0.052   
l_goser_exp_1 0.030   0.997 ***  
l_goser_exp_2 -0.084   -0.214   
l_goser_exp_3 0.077   -0.061   
      
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.023   -0.006   
MWald test 1.617 (0.656) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 9.640 (0.022) YES 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MERCH_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
const 2.067 **  8.478 **  
trend 0.015 **  0.067 ***  
l_gdp_1 1.487 ***  0.094   
l_gdp_2 -0.569 ***  -0.262   
l_merch_exp_1 -0.034   0.879 ***  
l_merch_exp_2 0.019   -0.146   
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 
-0.015   
-0.167   
MWald test 0.615 (0.735) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 1.9292 (0.165) 
NO 
CAUSALITY
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MANUF_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
const 1.870 **  4.649   
trend 0.014 **  0.043   
l_gdp_1 1.425 ***  -0.445   
l_gdp_2 -0.495 ***  0.390   
l_manuf_exp_1 0.032   0.990 ***  
l_manuf_exp_2 -0.052   -0.190   
Sum of lagged 
coefficients -0.020   -0.054   
MWald test 2.1683 (0.338) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 3.12472 (0.077) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
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With the SGC approach (Table 2.8) we do not detect any causality between the variables. The result 
is confirmed with Toda and Yamamoto (Tables 2.9a and 2.9b), except for the case GDP Granger-
cause GOSER_EXP where we identify causality with the 5% significance. This is somehow evident 
also in Table 8 if we notice that the direction of causality from GDP to GOSER_EXP has the lowest 
p-value (0.120), although this result is not significant from the statistical point of view. 
Things do not change when the causality analysis includes a trend, as expressed in Table 2.9b. 
Previous works using bivariate SGC found support for the ELG hypothesis (Sharma and Dhakal, 
1994, and Riezman et al, 1996), while others detected causality only from GDP to exports 
(Alsuwaidi and Al Shamsi, 1997). These studies do not apply the Toda and Yamamoto approach, 
therefore their  results are comparable with the first part of our SGC analysis as expressed in Table 
8, where we detected no causality. The different results may be due to a different length of the time 
series, that in the cited works extend from 1960 to the early 1990s, while we reached 2010. 
The changes in the trade strategy of the 1970s and the important economic reforms introduced since 
the 1990s suggest however to improve the analysis controlling for possible structural breaks. 
Table 2.10 below shows the results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test.  
All the variables are I(1), therefore we can proceed with the study of the cointegration properties of 
the variables. 
Table 2.10  Zivot and Andrews test for unit roots. Case with trend. 
Levels First Differences 
Variables 
t-statistics lags t-statistics lags 
Break 
year 
log_gdp -3.28 3 -8.92 5 1973
log merch_imp -3.56 0 -6.62 0 1973
log merch_exp -4.39 5 -5.94 0 1997
log manuf_imp -3.59 0 -6.38 0 1969
log manuf_exp -2.30 0 -5.34 0 2006
log goser_imp -2.26 1 -5.01 0 1973
log goser_exp -2.20 1 -10.37 5 1973
Source: author s calculations. Lag lengths are determined with the General to Specific method. 
The critical values are -4.93 and -4.42 at the 1 and 5 percent significance levels.  
In the framework allowing for structural breaks, we apply the Luetkepohl et al (2004) test for 
cointegration, as implemented by Pfaff (2008). The number of lags has been determined by the 
application of the Schwarz information criteria (BIC) and results to be two. 
There is no evidence of cointegration between the variables, except for GDP and manufactured 
goods only when controlling for manufactured imports (see Table 2.11), with a break in 1987. 
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Such result is much more restrictive than in the case with parameter stability, since there the 
inclusion of imports determined cointegration between GDP and exports, whatever their definition.  
Table 2.11  Cointegration tests allowing for structural breaks: Luetkepohl approach.       
Cointegration 
vectors 
Hypothesized 
number of 
coint. equations trace 
5% 
critical value rank Break year 
     
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp None 15.24 15.83 0 1998 
At most 1 4.91 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp None 14.45 15.83 0 1999 
At most 1 5.03 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp None 9.77 15.83 0 1976 
At most 1 4.03 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp, 
l_goser_imp None 24.91 28.45 0 1974 
At most 1 12.93 15.83   
At most 2 4.69 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp, 
l_merch_imp None 28.21 28.45 0 1974 
At most 1 13.80 15.83   
At most 2 4.72 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp, 
l_manuf_imp None 30.01 28.45 1 1987 
At most 1 14.61 15.83    
At most 2 2.93 6.79    
The number of lags is two and is determined with the Schwarz (BIC) criterion.  
Moving to the causality relationship, we will apply a VECM to the cointegrated variables, GDP and 
manufactures, while for non cointegrated variables we will rely on a VAR model adopting a SUR 
estimator. 
In the VECM estimation, the chosen lag length is two, according to the Schwarz criterion, while a 
trend is found not significant at the 5% critical level. 
The results in Table 2.12 confirm that no causality relationship exists from GDP to manufactured 
exports, since the error correction term is not significant. We detect instead causality from 
manufactured goods to GDP, with the negative sign of the EC coefficient (-0.419) suggesting a 
process of long-run adjustment towards equilibrium. 
The differenced coefficients are never significant, thus we cannot confirm a short-run relationship 
between the variables. 
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Such results are in line with the previous analysis conducted in a framework of parameter stability.  
Table 2.12  VEC Model according to Luetkepohl et al (1992).  
Independent 
Variables 
Dep var:
logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logMANUF_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logMANUF_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
logGDP_1 0.155  -0.544  1.190 ** 
logMANUF_EXP_1 -0.022  -0.199  0.111  
logMANUF_IMP_1 -0.042  -0.190  0.462  
EC -0.419 *** -0.321  0.625  
BIC -2.751      
Durbin -Watson 1.901  1.905  1.906  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
46.955 
(0.000)  
46.955 
(0.000)  
46.955 
(0.000)  
Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). EC is the error correction term.  
The seemingly unrelated regression approach is applied to the non-cointegrated variables: GDP, 
exports of goods and services, exports of merchandises, and exports of manufactures. In practice, all 
the bivariate relationships without imports. 
The order of integration of the variables in the unit-root test was one, and the appropriate lag length 
chosen with a bivariate VAR in differences is one, according to the Schwarz criterion. Therefore, 
the number of lags in the SUR model is set to two. 
In the equation with GOSER as explanatory variable, a trend is found significant at the 5% critical 
value (p-value 0.027) and the Quandt and Andrews test for breaks at unknown date gives evidence 
of a break in 1987 at the 1% significance level. The inverse relationship with GDP as independent 
variable shows instead a significant trend (p-value 0.001) but no evidence of breakpoints. 
In the equations with MERCH and GDP a trend and two breaks are found significant at the 1% 
critical value. The break years are 1987 in the relation from MERCH to GDP and  1991 from GDP 
to MERCH. 
In the equation from MANUF to GDP a trend and one break in 1988 are found significant, but in 
the inverse relationship we do not detect any trend or break. 
Thus we estimate SUR models in levels with a trend and a dummy variable for each break, whose 
results are reported in Table 2.13.  
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Table 2.13  Granger causality test (Box and Jenkins approach allowing for structural breaks)  with trend.  
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GOSER_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
Const 3.610 ***  5.693 ***  
trend 0.020 ***  0.050 ***  
Dummy 1987 0.120 **  n.a.   
l_gdp_1 1.209 ***  1.120 ***  
l_gdp_2 -0.470 ***  -1.153 ***  
l_goser_exp_1 0.067   1.012 ***  
l_goser_exp_2 0.034   -0.279 *  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.115   -0.032   
MWald test 
5.365 (0.068) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
11.301 (0.004) YES 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MERCH_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
Const 2.679 **  9.063 **  
Trend 0.018 **  0.070 ***  
Dummy 1987 0.048   n.a.   
Dummy 1991 n.a.   0.048   
l_gdp_1 1.465 ***  0.152   
l_gdp_2 -0.583 ***  -0.341   
l_merch_exp_1 -0.033   0.875 ***  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients -0.006   
-0.169   
MWald test 
0.536 (0.765) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
1.702 (0.427) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MANUF_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
VARIABLES       
Const -0.111   -0.973   
Trend 0.002   n.a.   
Dummy 1988 -0.094   n.a.   
l_gdp_1 1.470 ***  -0.231   
L_gdp_2 -0.480    ***  0.4182   
L_manuf_exp_1 0.082   1.007 ***  
L_manuf_exp_2 -0.061   -0.173   
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.002   
0.187   
MWald test 
2.811 0.245 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
3.554 0.169 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
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The introduction of the breakpoints in the equations with MERCH does not allow to identify a 
causality relation between the variables, thus confirming the results obtained in the Toda and 
Yamamoto approach. We are able to detect causality only in the relationship from GDP to GOSER, 
thus supporting the GLE hypothesis. 
This latter result could be due to the fact that the two main sources of income for services, tourism 
and the Suez Canal, are held by foreign companies and the Government respectively. Thus, they do 
not display any direct effect on the economic growth.  
The productive sector expressed in manufactures has a positive impact on growth, as stated in the 
VECM analysis with the significance of the error correction term (Table 2.12), although in this case 
a major effect seems to be due to imports. It seems, in fact, that the leading variables are GDP and 
imports instead of exports. Such result would support the hypothesis on the role of imports in 
boosting GDP through exports and could be applicable to Egypt whose main imports are 
machineries and spare parts used for intermediate processing before exporting the final products. 
Such result is not in line with previous works on Egypt in the trivariate case. For example, Riezman 
et al. (1996) and AbuQarn (2001) found no cointegration and no causal relationship at all between 
GDP and exports, even when exports are expressed as manufactured goods. The source of the 
different result might be that AbuQarn used constant data while we have carried out the present 
analysis with current data.  
Further studies should also consider the importance of the oil sector, which is marked by the 
massive presence of foreign firms and is strictly under the control of the Government. 
For sake of completeness, we have also implemented the Luetkepohl methodology with constant 
data. The results are exposed in the Appendix. We did not detect cointegration among the variables  
and the causality analysis is in line with the results obtained in the model with current data. 
2.10 Trade with the European Union: data and results 
In this section we will perform a causality analysis looking into Egypt s trade with the European 
Union. In this case, the export has been clustered into major categories in order to determine 
whether there is a specific sector that has an impact on GDP 
Data are expressed in current LE and range from 1998 to 2010. The choice of including the years 
2008-2010, hit by the economic crises, is due to the need of dealing with a longer time series. 
GDP is from the WB-WDI while data on import and export are from the Eurostat database, and are 
expressed in current Euro. Therefore, we have used the cross exchange rate with the US$ to convert 
all data in Egyptian pound. 
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The variables Exp_eu and Imp_eu are Egypt s total export to and import from the European Union. 
The former is further detailed as Agritex_x (the sum of agricultural and textile exports), Chemals_x 
(chemicals and metals exports), Fuels_x and the residual category Oth_x (other exports).  
Table 2.14 reports the results of the unit-root analysis conducted with the standard ADF and KPSS 
tests and with the Zivot & Andrews test, allowing for structural breaks. According to the KPSS test, 
all the variables are stationary in their first differences, or I(1).  
For sake of completeness, we also present the results of the ADF unit-root test, that shows no clear 
evidence of the stationarity of the variables in their first difference. Indeed, the variables GDP, 
AGRITEX and METALS still have unit-roots after first differencing. However, critics suggest that 
the ADF test gives contradictory results according to the number of lags, and moreover the limited 
extension of the time series does not allow us to increase the lags above eight. In conclusion, we 
prefer to rely on the KPSS test. The introduction of a trend in the KPSS test gives as a result that 
almost all the variables are stationary already in levels at the 10% critical values, while first 
differencing turns the variables into non stationarity. 
Finally, the test allowing for structural breaks shows that imports are not stationary even after first 
differencing, while GDP and exports are I(1). Therefore, the cointegration analysis allowing for 
structural breaks will be conducted only with GDP and exports. 
 74
Table 2.14  Unit-root tests. 
ADF and KPSS: parameter stability, with constant only 
Levels First Differences 
Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat lags ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat 
log_gdp -0.107 0.862 0 -1.884 0.243 
log exp_eu -2.415 1.061 0 -3.320 0.224 
log imp_eu -0.559 0.579 2 -4.860 0.222 
log agritex_x -0.862 0.512 4 -2.089 0.255 
log chemals_x -1.290 1.162 0 -5.210 0.104 
log fuels_x -1.102 0.945 2 -4.170 0.177 
log oth_x -0.810 1.034 5 -3.173 0.298 
ADF and KPSS: parameter stability, with constant and trend 
Levels First Differences 
Variables 
ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat lags ADF t-stat KPSS t-stat 
log_gdp -2.815 0.128 3 -2.574 0.195 
log exp_eu -3.303 0.104 2 -3.290 0.144 
log imp_eu -5.562 0.099 1 -4.436 0.127 
log agritex_x -2.766 0.104 3 -2.041 0.107 
log chemals_x -3.248 0.112 4 -5.153 0.085 
log fuels_x -3.105 0.132 4 -4.078 0.147 
log oth_x -3.468 0.124 4 -3.101 0.103 
Zivot and Andrew: structural breaks, with trend 
Levels First Differences Variables 
t-statistic lags t-statistic lags Break year 
log_gdp -3.796 0 -5.389 0 2000 
log exp_eu -3.105 0 -4.940 0 1992 
log imp_eu -3.740 2 -3.597 2 1988 
Source: author s calculations. Lag lengths are determined with the General to Specific method. 
The McKinnon critical values for 20 observations are - 3.81 (-3.02; -2.65) at the 1 (5; 10) percent significant level, 
with constant only and - 4.499 (-3.658; -2.269) at the 1 (5; 10) percent significant level, with constant and trend. 
The KPSS critical values are 0.356 and 0.481 and 0.701 at the 10 and 5 and 1 percent significant level with 
constant only and 0.124 and 0.149 and 0.208 at the 10 and 5 and 1percent significant level with constant and 
trend. 
The Zivot and Andrews critical values are - 5.57 (-5.08; -4.82) at the 1 (5; 10) percent significant level  
As happened in the study of the total trade, the graphical examination of the EU series (see 
Appendix) suggests a linear trend in the cointegration relation as well, thus in the Johansen test 
procedure we have applied the so-called Case 3: Unrestricted constant, whose results are exposed in 
Table 2.15. One cointegration relationship emerges between GDP and total exports, while the 
system including imports shows two cointegrating vectors. 
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Although the results of the unit-root test are quite uncertain, we have attempted a cointegration 
analysis for the variables composing the detailed exports. 
However, the shortness of the time series and the relative high number of variables lead to 
indecisive results. In fact, the critical values from McKinnon et al (1998) or from Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992) are no longer applicable and we refer to the p-value specifically computed for small samples.  
In this case the number of cointegrating vector would be two. 
Given the misleading results that possibly would come out from a standard VECM approach and 
the non applicability of the SGC, we will not go further with the analysis of the detailed trade with 
the EU, that could be instead the subject of further studies with a longer time series.  
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Table 2.15  Johansen cointegration tests. Case 3: Unrestricted constant. 
Critical values from McKinnon, Haug, 
Michelis (1998), 5% critical level.        
COINTEGRATION VECTORS Hypothesis 
lambda-
max 
critical 
value trace 
critical 
value lags rank 
       
l_gdp, l_exp_eu None 9.4057 15.0200 13.8880 18.1100 1 0 
At most 1 4.4819 8.1900 4.4819 8.1900   
l_gdp, l_exp_eu, l_imp_eu None 22.09 21.4900 42.64 31.8800 3 2 
At most 1 19.82 15.0200 20.54 18.1100   
At most 2 0.72 8.1900 0.72 8.1900   
l_gdp, l_agritex_x, l_chemals_x, l_fuels_x, 
l_oth_x None 58.804 38.320 112.310 88.790 2 1 
At most 1 28.626 32.120 53.511 63.870   
At most 2 13.186 25.830 24.885 42.920   
At most 3 11.139 19.380 11.699 25.860   
At most 4 0.55969 12.520 0.55969 12.520   
DETAILED EXPORT CORRECTED FOR SAMPLE SIZE (Reinsel and Ahn, 1992) 
trace p-value lags rank 
l_gdp, l_agritex_x, l_chemals_x, l_fuels_x, 
l_oth_x,  None   112.310 0.1017 2 2 
At most 1   53.511 0.3464   
At most 2   24.885 0.4580   
At most 3   11.699 0.2791   
At most 4   0.55969 0.5122   
Critical values from Osterwald_Lenum 
(1992), 95% Hypothesis 
lambda-
max 
critical 
value trace 
critical 
value lags rank 
COINTEGRATION VECTORS        
l_gdp, l_exp_eu None 9.4057 15.6700 13.8880 19.9600 1 0 
At most 1 4.4819 9.2400 4.4819 9.2400   
l_gdp, l_exp_eu, l_imp_eu None 22.09 22.00 42.64 34.91 3 2 
At most 1 19.82 15.67 20.54 19.96   
At most 2 0.72 9.24 0.72 9.24   
l_gdp, l_agritex_x, l_chemals_x, l_fuels_x, 
l_oth_x None 58.804 36.41 112.310 77.74 2 1 
At most 1 28.626 30.33 53.511 54.64   
At most 2 13.186 23.78 24.885 34.55   
At most 3 11.139 16.87 11.699 18.17   
At most 4 0.55969 3.74 0.55969 3.74   
DETAILED EXPORT CORRECTED FOR SAMPLE SIZE (Reinsel and Ahn, 1992) 
trace p-value lags rank 
l_gdp, l_agritex_x, l_chemals_x, l_fuels_x, 
l_oth_x, None   112.310 0.1017 2 2 
At most 1   53.511 0.3464   
At most 2   24.885 0.4580   
At most 3   11.699 0.2791   
At most 4   0.55969 0.5122   
The number of lags is determined with the Schwarz information criterion.          
        
Following the results obtained with the Johansen cointegration analysis, we model a VAR in levels 
with 2 lags for the variables GDP and exports_EU in a SUR framework (Table 2.16). In this 
framework we detect Granger causality from exports to GDP. 
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However, to test the robustness of the results we have run a VAR with trend, thus assessing instead 
the inverse causality from exports to GDP. 
We believe that this could be due to a quite short time series, and for this reason the results may not 
be consistent.  
Table 2.16  Granger causality test (Toda and Yamamoto approach as implemented by Rambaldi and Doran). 
Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  
We also proceed with the cointegration and causality analysis in a framework of structural breaks, 
and conduct the analysis following Luetkepohl et al (2004).  
As in the case with parameter stability, we are not able to detect any cointegration relationship, and 
the introduction of a trend does not change the results of the analysis (Table 2.17).   
CASE WITHOUT 
TREND 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable:  
l_ EXP_EU  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to exports 
VARIABLES       
const 0.261   -0.471   
l_gdp_1 1.235 ***  0.639   
l_gdp_2 -0.278   -0.322   
l_exp_1 0.094 **  1.050 ***  
l_exp_2 -0.052   -0.386 *  
      
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.042   0.317   
MWald test 7.182 (0.028) 
YES 
2.312 (0.315) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
CASE WITH 
TREND 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable:  
l_ EXP_EU  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to exports 
VARIABLES       
const 5.700   83.050 ***  
trend 0.024   0.375 ***  
l_gdp_1 1.035 ***  -2.422 ***  
l_gdp_2 -0.307 *  -0.762   
l_exp_1 0.046   0.324 *  
l_exp_2 0.073   0.519 ***  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.054   -3.184   
MWald test 4.807 0.090 
NO 
CAUSALITY 38.555 0.000 YES 
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Table 2.17  Cointegration tests allowing for structural breaks.       
COINTEGRATION 
VECTORS 
Hypothesized 
number of coint. 
equations trace 
5% 
critical value rank break year 
     
l_gdp, l_exp_eu None 12.2800 15.83 0 1991 
At most 1 3.3000 6.79   
l_gdp, l_exp_eu 
l_imp_eu None 21.07 28.45 0 2000 
At most 1 11.32 15.83   
At most 2 3.05 6.79   
Thus, we perform a bivariate VAR model with Seemingly Unrelated estimators for GDP and 
exports. According to the Toda and Yamamoto approach, the number of lags will be 2. We cannot 
perform the same analysis for the second equation with imports because the optimal number of lags 
would be 4, but the number of observations is insufficient to carry the regression. Given the limits 
of the Standard Granger Causality approach already discussed, we decide not to proceed with the 
study, since the results would not be robust. 
Going back to the bivariate VAR with GDP and exports, the QLR test shows two breaks significant 
at the 1% significance level: one in 1993 with GDP as dependent variable and one in 2003 in the 
inverse relation. Moreover, a trend is found significant in the second equation, so we will include all 
these variables in the model. The results are exposed in Table 18 and confirm what we found in the 
model with parameter stability. 
We assess a bidirectional causality between GDP and exports with the EU. The support for the ELG 
hypothesis could be explained by the relative importance of the trade with the European Union, 
compared with other trade partners. Exports towards the EU has always been free of duties for most 
of the goods excluding agricultural products, and this may have displayed positive effects on the 
Egyptian economic growth.  
The possible positive effect of a reduction of tariffs in the agricultural sector by the EU, could be 
the subject of further studies. 
On the other hand, Egypt s economic and technological development of the latest decades can 
explain the evidence in favour of the GLE hypothesis. This result, obtained with the data on trade 
with the EU, further support the conclusions of the analysis of total Egyptian exports.  
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Table 2.18  Granger causality test (Box and Jenkins approach allowing for structural breaks)  with trend.  
To conclude the study, we will try now to detect some information on the bivariate relationship 
between GDP and the components of the exports with the EU, making use of the impulse response 
analysis. 
Figure 12 shows that in general a shock in one of the components of the exports with the EU always 
has a positive impact on the value of GDP, reaching the peak within five to six periods after the 
shock. The impact on the percentage variation of GDP displays its effects within the first three 
periods. 
Fuels and metals are the variables that seem to have a major effect on GDP. 
The case of textiles is instead quite peculiar, since after the customer initial positive effect, the 
shock leads to a sudden decrease of the level of GDP since period 3 and ends with GDP settling 
slightly below the initial level.  
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
exports to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_ EXP_EU  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to exports 
VARIABLES       
const 0.024   64.689 ***  
trend n.a.   0.270 ***  
D1993 -0.125 ***  n.a.   
D2003 n.a.   0.318 *  
l_gdp_1 0.915 ***  -1.909 **  
l_gdp_2 0.026   -0.436    
l_exp_1 0.049   0.275 *  
l_exp_2 0.027   0.460 **  
      
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.074   -2.404   
MWald test 11.658 (0.003) YES 12.502 (0.002) YES 
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Figure 2.12  Impulse response of l_GDP to shocks of components of the exports towards the EU. 
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2.11 Conclusion  
We have studied the direction of the relationship between GDP and exports applying the latest 
econometric methodologies.  
The results on total trade support the Growth-led Export hypothesis and reveal an important role 
played by imports. Indeed, the trivariate analysis support the inverse causality relationship from 
exports and imports to GDP. This suggests that in the world economy Egypt plays the role of a 
country that transforms the imported intermediate goods into final products for exports. 
This view is also supported when dealing only with trade with the European Union, Egypt s main 
trading partner. However, in this part of the study, we have detected bidirectional causality between 
GDP and total exports, thus finding a positive effect from exports to GDP. 
The duty-free policy adopted since decades by the EU could explain the causality direction from 
exports to GDP and suggests that further liberalizations, on the EU side, in the field of agricultural 
products could be beneficial to the Egyptian economy. 
The next step for Egypt could be the consolidation of her role of final goods producer with regards 
to the EU, challenging the predominance of the Eastern European Countries. 
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Appendix to Part 2  
Figure 2.A  ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots: total trade and trade with EU.   
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Table 2.A  Johansen cointegration tests. Case 2: Restricted constant.        
Cointegration 
vectors 
Hypothesized 
number of 
coint. 
equations 
lambda-
max 
critical 
value trace 
critical 
value rank 
      
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp None 16.71 15.6700 21.67 19.9600 1 
At most 1 4.96 9.2400 4.96 9.2400   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp None 70.94 15.6700 73.47 19.9600 1 
At most 1 2.53 9.2400 2.53 9.2400   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp None 70.9610 15.6700 73.7150 19.9600 1 
At most 1 2.7536 9.2400 2.7536 9.2400   
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp, 
l_goser_imp None 102.19 22.00 111.69 34.91 1 
At most 1 6.47 15.67 9.51 19.96   
At most 2 3.04 9.24 3.04 9.24   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp, 
l_merch_imp None 93.24 22.00 108.22 34.91 1 
At most 1 10.61 15.67 14.97 19.96   
At most 2 4.37 9.24 4.37 9.24   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp, 
l_manuf_imp None 105.370 15.670 118.920 19.960 1 
At most 1 10.084 9.240 13.557 9.240   
At most 2 3.474 9.240 3.474 9.240   
Critical values from McKinnon, Haug, Michelis (1998), 5% critical level. The number of lags is determined with 
the BIC criteria.                  
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Table 2.B  Johansen cointegration tests. Case 4: Unrestricted constant and restricted trend.        
Cointegration 
vectors 
Hypothesized 
number of coint. 
equations lambda-max critical value trace critical value rank 
      
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp None 16.550 19.38 20.278 25.86 0 
At most 1 3.729 12.52 3.729 12.52   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp None 9.230 19.38 10.335 25.86 0 
At most 1 1.106 12.52 1.106 12.52   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp None 6.828 19.38 7.772 25.86 0 
At most 1 0.944 12.52 0.944 12.52   
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp, 
l_goser_imp None 36.212 25.83 48.484 42.92 1 
At most 1 9.650 19.38 12.272 25.86   
At most 2 2.622 12.52 2.622 12.52   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp, 
l_merch_imp None 31.823 25.83 47.376 42.92 1 
At most 1 10.358 19.38 15.553 25.86   
At most 2 5.196 12.52 5.196 12.52   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp, 
l_manuf_imp None 46.676 25.83 60.261 42.92 1 
At most 1 8.259 19.38 13.585 25.86   
At most 2 5.326 12.52 5.326 12.52   
Critical values from McKinnon, Haug, Michelis (1998), 5% critical level. The number of lags is determined with 
the BIC criteria.                       
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Table 2.C  Trivariate VEC model for causality test. Case IV Unrestricted constant and restricted trend . 
Export as the sum of Goods and Services 
Independent 
Variables 
Dep var:
logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logGOSER_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logGOSER_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant -0.492 ** 0.991  2.152 *** 
logGDP_1 0.198  1.227 ** 1.901 *** 
logGOSER_EXP_1 -0.017  0.047  -0.287  
logGOSER_IMP_1 0.066  0.323  0.553 ** 
EC -0.051 ** 0.090  0.195 *** 
BIC -4.692  -4.692  -4.692  
Durbin -Watson 2.025  1.931  2.048  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
50.014 
(0.000)  
50.014 
(0.000)  
50.014 
(0.000)  
      
Export as Merchandises 
Independent 
Variables 
Dep var:
logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logMERCH_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logMERCH_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant -0.227  0.543  1.619 *** 
logGDP_1 0.296 * 0.555  1.997 *** 
logMERCH_EXP_1 0.026  0.016  0.095  
logMERCH_IMP_1 0.038  0.022  0.289 ** 
EC -0.051 ** 0.077  0.290 *** 
BIC -2.841  -2.841  -2.841  
Durbin -Watson 1.978  1.987  1.952  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
16.763 
(0.010)  
16.763 
(0.010)  
16.763 
(0.010)  
Export as Manufactures 
Independent 
Variables 
Dep var:
logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logMANUF_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
Dep var: 
logMANUF_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 0.955 *** -0.978  -3.512 *** 
logGDP_1 0.074  0.357  2.599 *** 
logMANUF_EXP_1 0.056  0.083  -0.009  
logMANUF_IMP_1 -0.020  0.006  0.505 *** 
EC -0.222 *** 0.289  0.868 *** 
BIC -2.751  -2.751  -2.751  
Durbin -Watson 1.897  1.763  1.744  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
8.197 
(0.223)  
8.197 
(0.223)  
8.197 
(0.223)  
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Table 2.D  Trivariate VEC model for causality test. Case II Restricted constant .        
Export as the sum of Goods and Services 
Independent 
Variables logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logGOSER_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logGOSER_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 
logGDP_1 0.206  1.063 ** 1.880 *** 
logGOSER_EXP_1 -0.006  0.070  -0.295  
logGOSER_IMP_1 0.015  0.264  0.520 * 
EC -0.120 *** 0.047  0.166 * 
BIC -4.774  -4.774  -4.774  
Durbin -Watson 1.981  1.830  1.890  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
54.025 
(0.000)  
54.025 
(0.000)  
54.025 
(0.000)  
      
Export as Merchandises 
Independent 
Variables logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMERCH_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMERCH_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 
logGDP_1 0.294 * 0.572  2.091 *** 
logMERCH_EXP_1 0.060  0.121  0.152  
logMERCH_IMP_1 0.004  -0.053  0.285 * 
EC -0.125 *** -0.065  0.310 *** 
BIC -2.870  -2.870  -2.870  
Durbin -Watson 2.083  2.005  1.900  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
20.153 
(0.002)  
20.153 
(0.002)  
20.153 
(0.002)  
Export as Manufactures 
Independent 
Variables logGDP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMANUF_EXP 
Significance: 
1%: *** logMANUF_IMP 
Significance: 
1%: *** 
constant 
logGDP_1 0.145  0.786  2.819 *** 
logMANUF_EXP_1 0.063 * 0.128  0.007  
logMANUF_IMP_1 -0.036  -0.154  0.435 ** 
EC -0.256 *** -0.057  0.712 *** 
BIC -2.888  -2.888  -2.888  
Durbin -Watson 1.900  1.826  1.783  
Doornik Hansen 
(p-value) 
4.690 
(0.584)  
4.690 
(0.584)  
4.690 
(0.584)  
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Table 2.E  Cointegration tests allowing for structural breaks: Luetkepohl approach. Constant data.       
Cointegration 
vectors 
Hypothesized 
number of coint. 
equations trace 
5% 
critical value rank Break year 
     
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp None 9.90 15.83 0 1981 
At most 1 2.57 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp None 7.99 15.83 0 1981 
At most 1 2.30 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp None 9.43 15.83 0 1981 
At most 1 2.34 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_goser_exp, 
l_goser_imp None 21.26 28.45 0 1974 
At most 1 11.06 15.83   
At most 2 3.57 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_merch_exp, 
l_merch_imp None 24.16 28.45 0 1974 
At most 1 8.98 15.83   
At most 2 2.45 6.79   
l_gdp, 
l_manuf_exp, 
l_manuf_imp None 19.67 28.45 0 1974 
At most 1 9.30 15.83    
At most 2 2.80 6.79    
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Table 2.F  Granger causality test (Box and Jenkins approach allowing for structural breaks) . Constant data.  
VARIABLES 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from exports 
to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GOSER_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
Const -0.534   -10.867 ***  
trend 0.003   -0.008 ***  
Dummy 1987 -0.135 ***  -0.196 *  
l_gdp_1 0.679 ***  0.938 *  
l_gdp_2 0.317 *  -0.251   
l_goser_exp_1 -0.010   1.008 ***  
l_goser_exp_2 0.038   -0.282 *  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.028   0.321   
MWald test 1.222 (0.542) NO CAUS. 4.917 (0.085) YES 
MWald test 
without trend 0.385 (0.824) NO CAUS. 
10.668 (0.004) YES 
VARIABLES 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from exports 
to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MERCH_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
Const -2.051   -15.369   
Trend 0.001   -0.006   
Dummy 1981 -0.142 ***  -0.547 ***  
l_gdp_1 0.755 ***  -0.5605   
l_gdp_2 0.327 **  1.403   
l_merch_exp_1 -0.050 *  0.872 ***  
l_merch_exp_2 0.051 *  -0.127   
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.0005   0.843   
MWald test 3.631 (0.162) NO CAUS. 0.430 (0.5119) NO CAUS. 
MWald test 
without trend 3.420 (0.180) NO CAUS. 1.241 (0.537) NO CAUS. 
VARIABLES 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from exports 
to gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_MANUF_EXP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from gdp to 
exports 
Const -1.918   26.565 **  
Trend 0.0008   0.0624 ***  
Dummy 1981 -0.132 ***  -0.290 . *  
l_gdp_1 0.688 ***  -1.798 **  
L_gdp_2 0.388 **  1.067   
L_manuf_exp_1 0.008   0.914 ***  
L_manuf_exp_2 -0.0074   -0.294 **  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.0008   
-0.730   
MWald test 0.108 (0.947) NO CAUS. 0.0862 (0.769) NO CAUS. 
MWald test 
without trend 0.286761 (0.866) 
NO CAUS. 1.29789 (0.522) NO CAUS. 
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Part 3 FDI and growth in Egypt: an ARDL approach   
Summary 
The paper deals with the relationship between FDI and GDP in Egypt. The application of the Pesaran s ARDL approach 
for cointegration shows that the effect of a shock in FDI has a negligible effect on GDP, either in the short-run and in 
the long-run. We have found instead a significant effect displayed by the human capital expressed in average years of 
education of the workforce. 
The Toda-Yamamoto causality methodology supports the FDI-led growth hypothesis. 
The study suggests that the poor performance of FDI could be due to an excessive concentration in the oil sector. 
Moreover, in spite of the dramatic increase in FDI of the recent years, the country could improve her attractiveness if 
more efforts are made to fight corruption.  
Introduction 
The economic theory has always perceived foreign direct investments (FDI) as beneficial for 
growth. 
Through FDI the hosting country not only receives liquidity as in the case of capital investments, 
rather acquires skills, management abilities and new technologies. These reflect in an enhanced 
productivity which in turn positively affects the GDP. Under the expectations of higher returns from 
the investment, FDI should be directed more towards developing countries, however the evidence 
shows that such hypothesis is not always true. 
In fact, according to the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2011), the share of FDI to developing 
and transition economies represented only the 52% of global flows, although this is a sharp increase 
if compared with the 25% reported for the year 2007. 
The literature and empirical studies have long questioned what are the factors that make a country 
attractive for FDI, but unfortunately a clear answer has not been given yet. 
While a number of issues have been suggested by the theory, the results of the empirical analysis 
are still inconclusive. It is clear however, that the hosting country must have reached a minimum 
threshold of economic development in terms of educational levels, infrastructures, financial 
development and openness to international trade. 
This study focuses on the experience of a single country that in the latest decades has introduced a 
number of reforms in the economic and financial sector, also with the aim of boosting growth 
through foreign investments. 
Our purpose is to assess whether there is evidence of a causal relationship between FDI and growth.  
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3.1 Literature review 
A first body of the literature examines firms behaviour, thus discussing the role of the FDI at the 
micro level (the so-called spillover effect).  
Dunning (1993), offers a systematic classification of FDI and singles out four reasons that lead 
firms to invests abroad: 
i. Resource seeking (vertical FDI), or the attempt to acquire production inputs at lower 
prices than in their own country, either natural resources, unskilled labour, or managerial 
and technological capabilities. The abundance of low cost natural resources seems to 
provide a reasonable explanation for FDI in developing countries (Groh and Wich, 2012).  
ii. Market seeking (horizontal FDI), that is the effort of better serving the market. The firm 
may engage FDI directly in the target market or in the neighbouring countries, however 
the aim is to reduce tariffs and transport costs associated with exports. Free zones26 with 
favourable tax regimes and easy bureaucracy should be able to attract FDI, as is reported 
in the case of Taiwan (Ranis and Schive, 1985), the Carribeans (Woodward and Rolfe, 
1993), and China (Fung et al., 2000). 
Although the determinants of the firms behaviour are often a combination of resource and market 
seeking, the distinction between them can help explaining apparently controversial empirical 
results. Sure enough, Brainard (1997) finds that higher tariffs are positive related to an increase of 
FDI in the USA, and Wheeler and Mody (1992) also detect the same effect for the US 
manufacturing sector. Most likely, such investments were of the horizontal type, aimed at hopping 
trade barriers. On the contrary, studies focused on developing countries and China find that 
openness is a strong determinant for FDI (Dees, 1998; Sing and Jun, 1995; Lecraw, 1991; Kravis 
and Lipsey, 1982). This suggests that these might be vertical FDI requiring considerable flows of 
goods in and out of the hosting country and therefore benefiting from easier trade conditions.  
The remaining items in Dunning (1993) are: 
iii. Efficiency seeking. Using Dunning s words, this occurs when firms take advantage of 
differences in the availability and costs of traditional factor endowments in different 
countries ; or when they take advantage of the economies of scale and scope and of 
differences in consumer tastes and supply capabilities . The hypothesis that foreign 
investments are more productive than the domestic capital and hence display a positive 
                                                
26
 The Free Zones are located within the national territory, but work in fact as offshore areas. To ease import and export 
procedures, they are usually sited near sea ports and airports. Companies operating in such areas enjoy exemptions from 
customs duties, sales taxes and taxes on capital assets and intermediate goods.   
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effect on the country s GDP growth is supported for example by Borensztein et al (1995) 
for a sample of 69 developing countries. 
iv. Strategic asset seeking (or Competence creating), when the firm s aim is acquiring a new 
technology or exploiting an asset. Skilled labour also is included in this category. Under 
this hypothesis, firms tend to localize in regions or countries with leading research centres, 
thus creating technological pools. Such a transfer of technology has been proved to be 
beneficial for the hosting country s economic growth, as assessed for example by an 
OECD study on OECD and developing countries (OECD, 1991).  
As the complementary point of view, another body of research studies what the determinants of FDI 
are, or in other words, what makes a country attractive for foreign firm s investments. 
Natural resources, skilled labour, the market size, the factor costs have been analyzed in the four 
points above. Although quite intuitive, these do not fully explain the direction of FDI, when we 
consider for example that the industrialized countries are often poor of natural resources but attract 
the bulk of the world s total investments. In addition, there is no clear evidence of the effects of a 
skilled workforce.  
Groh and Wich (2012) identify four further determinants of FDI, related to country-specific 
characteristics: 
i. The economic activity. Under this definition the authors include the macroeconomic 
stability and the size of the economy or the economic growth. Indeed, Rodrik (1999) 
argues as well that foreign firms tend to invest in more productive and faster growing 
economies, thus suggesting an inverse relationship from GDP to FDI. The degree of 
openness is another indicator of the willingness of a country to attract investments. 
Besides, joining Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) rises the expectations to receive 
more FDI. 
ii. Legal and political system. The transparency and predictability of the legal framework in 
the hosting country, a low level of corruption and political stability reduce the risks 
connected with the investment (UNCTAD, 2008; Ramcharran, 1999). This is one of the 
weakest points in several emerging and developing countries.  
iii. Business environment. This category includes in general the costs of establishing and 
running a firm in a foreign country: labour costs, the tax policies on FDI, the complexity 
of bureaucracy, and corruption that affects many emerging countries (see among others 
Wei, 2000; Baniak et al, 2005). 
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iv. Infrastructure, in the sense of an efficient transportation and communication system. For 
developing countries this feature seems determinant in the firms decisions of investments, 
as stated in Wheeler and Mody (1992).  
Although the classification of the determinants for FDI is quite exhaustive, it is in fact rather 
difficult, in empirical studies, to take into account all the possible variables affecting the FDI and 
their interactions, or which element prevails in each specific case study. 
Hence, a further step in Groh and Wich s work is the creation of an FDI index based on the four 
categories identified above. The application of the Index to their sample of 127 countries places 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates in the top ranking, while 
Venezuela, East Timor, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and Chad are ranked the lowest. 
Finally, Medveded (2012) claims that joining a PTA is often associated with an increase in FDI 
inflows. This is assessed by case studies on the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU, Brazil 
and Argentina to MERCOSUR, Mexico and Canada to NAFTA. The implementation of the 
European Common Market itself lead to an increase in intra-EU FDI. However, it is not possible to 
generalize such findings and some studies also suggest that the positive effect may not depend on 
the PTA itself, but rather on the reforms implemented by the candidate countries before joining the 
agreement (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Graham and Wada, 2000). 
3.2 Previous empirical evidence 
In this section we will focus on previous studies conducted on the relationship between FDI and 
GDP. The econometric approach applied to recent works is pre-testing for unit-root and 
cointegration properties of the variables and then estimating a VECM for cointegrated variables or a 
VAR in differences in case of no cointegration. Besides the Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
cointegration tests and the standard VAR model, some authors also apply the Luetkepohl (2004) 
cointegration technique and the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) augmented VAR in levels for the 
causality analysis. Finally, a few studies are conducted with the Pesaran et al (2001) ARDL-ECM 
approach (Kyuntae and Hokyung, 2008; Pinn, 2011; Ellahi, 2012).  
While the economic theory suggests that FDI inflows should support GDP growth, the empirical 
evidence has not yet come to conclusive results on the relationship between FDI and economic 
growth.  
In combination with the most advanced econometric techniques, many studies introduce further 
variables other than FDI and GDP, in an attempt to avoid mis-specification of the models. The 
variables are chosen among those that could somehow have an impact on the main relationship, 
such as trade, the labour force, domestic capital (Cuadros et al., 2001; Kyuntae and Hokyung, 
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2008), the attained level of education (De Gregorio, 1999; Alalaja, 2010), the stock capital and 
indicators of financial development (De Gregorio, 1999; Khan, 2007), foreign aid (Ellahi, 2012). 
Indeed, such regressors express the specific characteristics and policies adopted by the different 
countries.  
Many developing countries, for example, show a limited capacity of absorbing the advanced 
technologies imported by foreign investing firms (Blomstroem et al, 2000), or have weak and 
inefficient capital markets that do not direct the financial flows towards real economy investments 
(Khan, 2007). Moreover, FDI seem to better display their effects in open economies and in an 
environment of economic and political stability (OECD, 1998). Otherwise, the benefits would be 
merely directed towards a higher rate of return of the investing firm, as suggested in 
Balasubramanyan et al (1996). 
Fedderke and Romm (2006) verify in their study of South Africa, that the market size and an export 
promotion policy attract FDI, while corporate taxation and wage costs have a negative impact. 
Interestingly, they also analyze how foreign investments combine with domestic capital, reporting a 
crowding-out effect of FDI on domestic investments in the short-run, but complementarity in the 
long term. 
Cuadros et al (2001) not only find a positive causal relationship from FDI to GDP in Mexico, but 
also controlled for the possible effects of openness to trade and claim that FDI supported exports in 
Mexico and Argentina. Indeed, the Mexican Government opened the economy already since the 
1980s. The results also confirm that for this country the foreign investments were export-oriented. 
Similar effects, with causality going from FDI to growth, have been obtained by Iqbal et al (2010) 
for Pakistan and by Kyuntae and Hokyung (2008) with the ARDL approach for Ireland. In both 
cases, export promotion and favourable taxation policies have been successful in attracting FDI.  
In a further ARDL study on Pakistan, Khan (2007) introduced a variable indicating the country s 
level of financial development, thus finding that a positive long-run relationship between FDI and 
GDP is reached only when the ratio private sector credit/GDP lies above 13%. However, the 
relationship between the financial market indicator and GDP is negative, thus supporting the 
hypothesis that such financial flows are not used for real investment purposes, or alternatively that 
the financial system is weak and inefficient. 
Indeed, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find that the positive effects of financial development on 
growth are displayed not only with a high volume of investments, but rather through efficiency. The 
evidence comes from a panel study of 69 countries. 
The necessity of a minimum level of financial development is also supported by panel data studies: 
Chien-Chiang and Chun-Ping (2009) who find a highly significant long-run relationship among 
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financial development, FDI and GDP in a dataset of 37 countries, and Azman-Saini et al (2010) 
support the point in their panel analysis of 91 countries. Among time series studies, AbuBader and 
AbuQarn (2005) confirm that the rise in private investments was supported by the financial 
liberalization that happened in Egypt since the 1990s. 
Ellahi (2012) confirms that in Pakistan FDI positively affect GDP in the long-run, along with the 
capital stock. Besides, he finds a bidirectional causality between GDP and foreign aid, supporting 
the hypothesis that foreign development assistance cause FDI. ARDL was the methodological 
approach adopted. 
Kalirajan et al (2009) select a few countries for a comparative study of the relationship among 
trade, FDI and GDP. They choose India and Pakistan as Asian countries that have recently open 
their economies, Malaysia and Thailand as Asian countries who have been successful in attracting 
FDI and that have a per capita income higher than the former two. Finally, Mexico and Chile again 
among the best FDI attractors but belonging to a different geographical area. They apply either 
Johansen and Juselius, and Luetkepohl cointegration analysis in bivariate regressions combining the 
three variables. The study shows that it is not possible to detect common paths of causality, since 
each country applied different policies to attract FDI or to facilitate trade. Thus, the evidence is 
again mixed.  
In separate papers on Mexico and Chile, Ramirez (2002, 2009, 2010) shows that in both 
experiences the economic reforms and changes in the legislation for investments contributed to 
attract FDI in those countries.  
Instead of measuring the impact on GDP, Pinn et al (2011) apply an ARDL approach to the 
relationship between FDI and employment growth in Malaysia. No cointegration is detected 
between the variables, while causality goes from FID to employment. 
Herzer et al (2008) apply the cointegration techniques on a country-by-country basis, finding a 
long-run relationship between FDI and growth only in four countries out of the 28 selected. 
Furthermore, no clear association is detected between FDI and the variables usually singled out as 
their determinants: education, financial development, openness. Egypt has been included in the 
sample as one of the major recipient of FDI in its region. Modelling the regressions for such 
country, Herzer et al. include a step dummy since 1980 to account for possible positive effects on 
GDP and increase in foreign aids following the peace treaty signed with Israel. The results for the 
period 1970-2003 indicate a positive long run effect of 4.7% on GDP due to a 1% shock in the ratio 
FDI/GDP and a bivariate causality relationship. In the short-run, instead the causality is directed 
from FDI to GDP. 
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In a panel analysis, Borensztein et.al (1995) found that FDI s positive impact on growth starts to 
occur at a human capital threshold of 0.52 years of adult secondary school. This is particularly 
evident for investment flows from developed to developing countries. FDI are found more 
productive than domestic capital and this seems to be due to a positive interaction with human 
capital. A similar threshold of 0.45 years of secondary education is found in the panel study by De 
Gregorio (1999). 
Again, the results of an ARDL model applied to the Jordan economy (Alalaja, 2010) support the 
hypothesis of a minimum level of education of the workforce, needed to deal with the technological 
changes introduced by foreign firms. 
In the next section we will treat in more detail the case study of Egypt, illustrating the country s 
efforts to attract foreign direct investments. 
3.3 FDI in Egypt 
After two decades of import-substitution policies, since the early 1970s, Egypt has turned to a more 
open economy, in order to attract foreign investments and support exports. 
Such trend has been strengthen in more recent years within the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ERSAP) supported by the IMF and implemented since 1991. Liberalization of the exchange rate, 
progressive reduction of tariffs and barriers to trade and privatizations are some of the reforms 
implemented. According to the economic theory, this should have create an economic environment 
more favourable to FDI. The Central Bank of Egypt suggests that FDI have been particularly 
attracted by the privatizations of public-owned companies, that also concerned sectors that were 
considered strategic and previously closed to private investments, such as banking, petrochemicals 
and telecommunications. 
Egypt also eased the bureaucratic procedures needed for the establishment of foreign enterprises, 
through the creation of a One Stop Shop for investors. The General Authority for Investment and 
Free Zones (GAFI) is in charge of regulating and facilitating investments. With this purpose, it 
provides support for all the necessary licences and residence and work permits, and in general 
offering a quick procedure to create and register new enterprises. It takes two days for the 
registration of a new company and no longer than two weeks for other official authorization and 
permits. 
The Social Fund for Development (SFD) is instead in charge of the small enterprises with less than 
50 workers. Similarly to GAFI, the SFD works as a link between the entrepreneurs and the 
administration and reduces bureaucracy, thus allowing the conclusion of all the procedures within 
30 days. 
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Following the economic theory assessing that the favourable tax regime of the Free Zones should be 
beneficial for FDI, in Egypt operate ten public Free Zones (listed in Table 3.1) and a number of 
private ones, as well. According to a report by the African Development Bank, in the fiscal year 
2007/08 more than 1,100 companies had established in the free zones, hiring a workforce of about 
230,000 units. 
The Qualified Industrial Zones (QIF) have instead been created following a protocol signed in 2004 
between Egypt  and Israel. It designated a few territories in the two countries as enclaves where 
merchandise may enter for purposes of export, without payment of duty or taxes, no matter what the 
country of origin of the merchandise .  
Table 3.1  Egyptian Public Free Zones. 
LOCATION FIELDS OF INVESTMENTS 
Alexandria Textile, food processing, chemicals and petrochemicals 
Nasr City, Cairo Food processing, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment 
Port Said Textile, chemicals, food processing, goods storage and re-
export 
Suez Petrochemicals, glass industry, ships industry and 
navigation services 
Ismailia Textile, computer HW and SW, chemicals, goods storage 
and re-export 
Damietta Petrochemicals, medical equipments, textile, furnitures. 
6th October City Radio and TV broadcasting and industries connected, 
hotels and tourists facilities. 
Shebin el-Kom, Menofia Gov. Textile and complementary industries 
Queft, Qena Gov. Food processing, pharmaceuticals 
East Port Said Containers and transit activities 
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade website.  
The country has also modified some legislation in order to improve the business environment and 
regulate the market for jobs. 
The establishment and operation of companies in Egypt is regulated by the Companies Law 
159/1981, improved by the Investment Law N. 8/1997 that introduced more incentives to private 
and foreign investments. Under the Investment Law, foreign investments are allowed within a list of 
16 possible fields, among which some that were previously restricted like mining, tourism, oil 
production and refining, and cinema. Foreign investors are allowed to own up to 100% of a 
company, although the Companies Law requires that the majority of the directors must be 
Egyptians and the employees must be represented in the Board. 
The new Labour Law N. 12/2003 introduced more flexibility in hiring and firing workers, also 
allowing the downsizing of the workforce for economic reasons. Moreover, the law has 
standardized the rights and relationships between employers and employees in all sectors except for 
the public employees. The right to strike and to join unions is also regulated by the Labour Law.  
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Finally, with the aim of encouraging the private financing of the necessary investments in 
infrastructures, the Government promoted the Public-Private Partnership Projects (PPP) initiative. 
The Ministry of Finance s Central Unit verifies that the projects are supported by sound analysis 
and that the selection of the partners takes place with fair and transparent competition. It works in 
co-operation with experts and consultant at international level.   
The African Development Bank reports that the boom in FDI that happened since 2004/2005 was 
due to the reforms and a favourable economic environment. Not only capital flew into the country, 
but also know-how and governance. 
Figures 3.1 illustrates the path of the ratio FDI/GDP in Egypt, showing the sudden increase in a few 
years after 2004 and until 2008, when the economic crisis broke up. Indeed, this trend is common to 
other countries of the MENA region, as represented in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.1  Foreign direct investments/ GDP in Egypt. Period 1970-2010. 
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Figure 3.2  Foreign direct investments/ GDP for selected MENA countries and selected years. 
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the composition of the FDI inflows in Egypt. Data from the Egyptian Central 
Bank show that foreign investments are concentrated in the oil sector, that in one year jumped from 
45% to almost 80% of total FDI inflows. Foreign companies are very much involved in the 
exploration activities and the setting up of the infrastructures needed to exploit the fields. Egypt is 
the largest African non-OPEC oil producer, and the second largest African producer of natural gas, 
following Algeria. According to the Central Bank of Egypt, 48.3% of investments in the oil sector 
come from the EU countries, mainly the UK and Belgium, while the USA contribute for about 33%. 
The second recipient of FDI is the Manufacturing sector, followed by Communications and IT that 
registered a sharp increase. However, the relative importance of such sectors is clearly negligible. In 
spite of the impressive development of tourism facilities, especially along the Red Sea coast, the 
FDI account for a mere 1% of the total. 
The main contributors to FDI inflows are the USA and the European Union, as evidenced in Figure 
3.4. The UK accounted for about 50% of the European investments in the fiscal year 2008/09, while 
in the previous year the share was close to 60%. 
Figure 3.3  Composition of FDI inflows for fiscal years 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. 
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Figure 3.4  Geographical distribution of FDI inflows for fiscal years 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. 
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In the next sections we will analyze whether the efforts in attracting new foreign investments have 
been beneficial for the country s economic growth measured in terms of GDP. 
Since the improvement in the economic environment happened in the latest years, we do not expect 
a  high impact of FDI, at least in the short term. However, we will also try to assess whether there is 
at least a causal relationship in the sense of Granger. 
3.4 Methodology 
In this paper we will study the relationship between GDP and FDI using the two-step cointegration 
method developed by Pesaran et al (2001), also known as ARDL bounds testing approach, and the 
Toda-Yamamoto (2005) methodology to assess causality. Moreover, we will include in the model 
other variables that could have an indirect impact on GDP or on FDI. 
Thus, the model takes the following semi-log linear form: 
(1) ttttt openlXDl
where Yt is GDP, Dt contains deterministic terms such as constant and trend, and Xt represents the 
list of variables included in the model: FDI inflows, education, gross fixed capital formation, 
exchange rate. Open is a measure of openness and t is the error term.  
The first step of the Pesaran s bounds testing procedure allows to assess the existence of a long-run 
relationship among the variables of Equation (1). In order to implement the test, the ARDL 
representation of Equation (1) can be formulated as: 
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The model expressed in Equation (2) can be estimated by OLS and an F- or Wald-test is conducted 
for the joint significance of the coefficients of the lagged levels of the variables, i.e.  
H0: b1 = b2 = b3 = b4 = b5 = b6 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis H1: b1  b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 0. 
Since the F- test used in such procedure does not have a standard distribution, two sets of critical 
values are provided by Pesaran et al for a given significance level. One set assumes that the 
variables are I(0) while the other assumes that they are all I(1).  
If the computed F-statistic lies within the bounds, the test becomes inconclusive. If the F-statistic 
falls below the lower bound, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the variables are not 
cointegrated. Lastly, if the F-statistic exceeds the upper bound, then the null hypothesis is rejected 
and we can conclude that the variables are cointegrated. 
Similarly to Johansen and Juselius (1998), Pesaran et al. compute the sets of critical values for five 
cases, according to the deterministic terms included in the model. 
Once the cointegration properties of the variables are detected, in step two the long run coefficients 
are estimated. The order of lags of the model is determined by the customary Information Criteria 
(Akaike, AIC or Schwarz Bayesian, BIC) before the model is estimated by OLS. Since we are 
dealing with annual data, Pesaran and Shin (2007) recommend not to exceed the maximum of two 
lags. In addition, we can obtain the estimation of the short-term coefficients by estimating an error 
correction model associated with the long-run estimates, like the one represented in Equation (3), 
where ECt is the one period lagged error correction term and  represents the speed of adjustment 
toward the long-run equilibrium: 
(3) 
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log log log log
log log
p p p
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i i i
p p p
t i t i t i t t
i i i
GDP a a t a GDP a FDI a EDUC
a GFCF a EXRAT a OPEN EC
At this stage it is also possible to test the stability of coefficients of the regression equations using 
the Brown et al. (1975) cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) 
tests, based on the recursive residuals. The stability of the coefficients is assessed when the statistics 
fall inside the bounds of the 5% significance. 
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The ARDL approach has many advantages in comparison to other cointegration procedures, such as 
Johansen and Juselius (1990). First, it is applicable irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) or 
I(1); it is appropriate for studies with small samples; then, it estimates the long-run and short-run 
components of the model simultaneously, removing problems associated with omitted variables and 
autocorrelation; finally, endogeneity problems and inability to test hypotheses on the estimated 
coefficients in the long-run associated with the Engle-Granger method are avoided.  
The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) method for causality is a powerful alternative to the standard 
Engle-Granger approach and can be applied irrespective of the integration or cointegration 
properties of the variables. The procedure consists in the estimation of an augmented VAR (k+dmax) 
in levels, where k is the optimal lag lengths of the system as determined by the Information Criteria 
and dmax is the order of integration determined with the unit-root test. Instead of the customary F-
statistic and Wald test, Toda and Yamamoto developed a modified Wald test (MWALD) with an 
asymptotical standard Chi-square distribution. Such statistic can be obtained estimating the model 
as a set of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), as proved in Rambaldi and Doran (1996). 
3.5 Data and results  
We are interested in the relationship between GDP and FDI inflows for Egypt. 
Data come from the World Bank s World Development Indicators and from the Barro-Lee database 
for education and cover the period from 1970 to 2010. The monetary variables are expressed in 
constant Egyptian Pound, base year 1992. 
According to what stated in the literature, we have chosen a number of variables that could have 
played a role in attracting FDI in Egypt: the exchange rate as Egyptian Pounds per US$, the existing 
fixed capital, the levels of education expressed in average years of schooling for the working-age 
population (between 15 and 64), openness computed as the sum of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP,  with the purpose of taking into account the country s openness to international 
trade, and the ratio Banks credit to private sector/GDP as the level of financial development. Such 
ratio expresses the volume of funds channelled to the private sector, and hence seems more efficient 
than M1, M2 or M3 in identifying the link between investments and growth (De Gregorio and 
Guidotti, 1995). 
The effects of these variable have been discussed in the previous sections. 
Although it is not necessary to assess the presence of unit-roots in the variables before applying the 
Pesaran s ARDL approach, we prefer to run the unit-root tests, to ascertain that the order of 
integration the variables is not bigger than one. Moreover, the order of integration from the unit-
root test will be useful in the Toda and Yamamoto causality analysis. 
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The results of the tests for unit-root, conducted with the general-to-specific method, are presented in 
Table 3.2. 
The ADF tests clearly assess that almost all the variables have unit-roots in levels and are stationary 
in their first differences at the 1% significance level. Education and FDI inflow and Gross Capital 
Formation are stationary already in levels, or I(0). Adding a trend does not change the results, 
except for Education, that seems to be stationary in first differences in the KPSS test. 
However, we are able to apply the bound test methodology since it allows the use of the variables 
whether they are I(0) or I(1).  
Table 3.2  Unit-root tests.  
Levels: constant only First differences: constant only 
ADF KPSS Lags ADF KPSS Lags 
log_gdp    -1.077 2.081 1 -3.545 *** 0.158 *** 0 
log fdi -5.171 *** 0.805 2 -3.893 *** 0.133 *** 3 
log educ    -2.791 * 2.005 1   -1.257    0.821 0 
log exrat     -0.866 2.016 1 -3.975 *** 0.084 *** 0 
log gfcf     -2.866 * 1.460 0 -4.655 *** 0.205 *** 0 
log open     -1.823   0.547 * 0 -4.226 *** 0.160 *** 0 
Levels: with trend First differences: with trend 
ADF KPSS Lags ADF KPSS Lags 
log_gdp     -2.060 0.400 1 -3.613 ** 0.081 *** 0 
log fdi -4.805 *** 0.200 2 -4.320 *** 0.061*** 3 
log educ     -1.502 0.508 1   -2.649 0.085 *** 0 
log exrat     -2.899    0.155 ** 1 -3.918 ** 0.084 *** 0 
log gfcf -3.539 ** 0.269 2 -4.890 *** 0.131 *** 0 
log open     -1.792 0.331 1 4.174 ** 0.093 *** 0 
Source: author s calculations. Lag lengths are determined with the General to Specific method with a maximum 
of 5 lags. 
The McKinnon critical values for 40 observations are -3.60 and -2.93 and -2.61 at the 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) 
percent significant level with constant only while -4.21 and -3.53 and -3.19 at the 1 and 5 and 10 percent 
significant level with constant and trend. 
The KPSS critical values are 0.739 and 0.463 and 0.352 at the 1; 5 and 10 percent significant level with constant 
only while  0.212 and 0.149 and 0.122 at the 1 and 5 and 10 percent significant level with constant and trend.  
Table 3.3 shows the results of the cointegration analysis under the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the lagged variables are zero.  
As anticipated before, we included in the models some variables that could have had an impact, 
thus, keeping the fundamental relationship between GDP and FDI, we modelled different 
combinations of the remaining variables. 
A constant and a trend are also added to all equations. 
The order of lags was obtained by means of the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), which tends to 
define more parsimonious specifications.      
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Table 3.3  Pesaran cointegration test. Dependent variable: lGDP. 
Progr. Regressors F-test 95 % 
Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
90 % 
Lower 
Bound 
90% Upper 
Bound 
1 lFDI 23.5393 7.104 7.910 5.862 6.568 
2 lFDI, lGFCF 19.5411 5.409 6.407 4.515 5.391 
3 lFDI, lEDUC 6.6289 5.409 6.407 4.515 5.391 
4 lFDI, LEDUC, 
lGFCF 
6.6513 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
5 lFDI, LEDUC, 
OPEN 
6.6082 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
6 lFDI, LEDUC, 
LEXRAT 
5.6241 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
7 lFDI, LEDUC, 
LGFCF, OPEN 
15.1323 3.944 5.127 3.307 4.377 
Critical value bounds for the F-statistic, case Intercept and Trend, Pesaran et al. (2001).  
In almost all models the F statistic falls above the upper 95% critical value, except for the case with 
FDI, EDUC and EXRAT (Progressive number 6), which however rejects the null of no 
cointegration at the 90% critical value. 
In conclusion, we detect cointegration among the variables and we are able to proceed with the 
second stage of the ARDL approach and estimate the long-run coefficients. Table 3.4 presents the 
results of models with different combinations of independent variables. The coefficients have been 
inferred by the estimates of the long run parameters b2 , b3 , b4 , b5 , b6 normalized on b1 in Eq. (2). 
For the selection of the variables, the General to Specific method has been applied. This has lead to 
the exclusion of some models for which the variables had the highest p-value, such as the trivariate 
cases (GDP, FDI, OPEN), (GDP, FDI, EXRAT) and (GDP, FDI, BKCREDIT). 
In the remaining models all coefficients are found statistically significant. 
The long run impact of FDI on GDP is not very remarkable, the highest coefficient being 0.049 in 
the first model. The variable that mostly affect GDP in the long run is the average years of 
education, assessing an impact varying from 0.215 to 0.509 for a 1% shock of this regressor. Such 
result may be explained by the sharp increase in the average years of education of the workforce, 
that rose from 1.3 in 1970 to 7 in 201027. Openness is the second most important regressor after 
education, a 1 percent change increasing GDP by around 0.1. The impact of the exchange rate is 
negligible. 
                                                
27 Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World,1950-2010. Paper 
revised in October 2010. 
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Table 3.4  Estimated long run coefficients. Dependent variable: lGDP.  
Regressors ARDL(1,1)FDI 
ARDL(1,1,0)
GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1)
EDUC 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, OPEN 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, 
EXRAT 
ARDL(1,1,0,0,1)
EDUC, GCFC, 
OPEN 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
lFDI_1 0.049 0.031 0.029 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.006 
(5.568) 
*** 
(3.385) 
*** 
(4.447) 
*** 
(3.177) 
*** 
(2.215) 
** 
(3.699) 
*** 
(2.945) 
*** 
lGFCF_1  0.098  0.084   0.047 
 
(2.505) 
***  
(4.208) 
***   
(2.967) 
*** 
lEDUC_1   0.215 0.241 0.509 0.364 0.454 
 
(1.785) 
* 
(3.019) 
*** 
(3.858) 
*** 
(3.835) 
*** 
(5.132) 
*** 
OPEN_1     0.180  0.116 
  
(3.495) 
***  
(4.074) 
*** 
lEXRAT_1      -0.076  
 
(-3.959) 
***  
The symbols ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. T-ratios in parenthesis.  
The inclusion of a dummy in 1982 does not change the results consistently (Table 3.4a). The year 
1982 has been signalled by the Quandt likelihood ratio test for breaks at unknown time (p-value = 
0.000) and could represent a break in the series following the peace treaty signed with Israel in 
1979, as suggested in Herzer (2008). 
The attempt to account for the level of financial development was fruitless, since the ratio Banks 
credit/GDP was always not significant and thus was excluded from the regression.  
Table 3.4a  Estimated long run coefficients. Dependent variable: Lgdp, with dummy. 
Regressors ARDL(1,1)FDI 
ARDL(1,1,0)
GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1)
EDUC 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, OPEN 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, 
EXRAT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
lFDI_1 0.032 0.025 0.031 0.016 0.031 0.019 
(6.321) 
*** 
(5.351) 
*** 
(6.524) 
*** 
(6.138) 
*** 
(6.524) 
*** 
(5.979) 
*** 
lGFCF_1  0.047  0.054   
(2.672) 
**  
(6.130) 
***   
lEDUC_1   0.142 0.141 0.372 0.165 
(1.785) 
* 
(3.464) 
*** 
(3.858) 
*** 
(2.869) 
*** 
OPEN_1     0.132  
(3.495) 
***  
lEXRAT_1      -0.042 
(-4.520) 
*** 
We complete the model estimation and present in Table 4 the short-run coefficients associated with 
the long-run relationship expressed in the Error Correction model of Equation (3). 
The one-lagged error correction term is always highly significant and has the expected negative 
sign, indicating that all models converge to the long-run equilibrium. The magnitude of the 
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coefficient implies that at least 33% of disequilibrium of the previous period converges towards the 
long-run equilibrium in the current year.  
Similarly to the long-run analysis, the short- run impact of FDI on GDP is negligible: the 
coefficients, all statistically significant, are in practice equal to zero. The variable mostly affecting 
GDP in the short run is Education, with a positive impact ranging from 0.592 to 0.930, significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
Among the diagnostics, the R2 suggests that the models fit the data reasonably well. The Durbin-
Watson test is close to two especially in the multivariate models (from Model 4 to Model 7), 
assessing the absence of residuals autocorrelation. The models pass the tests controlling for 
normality of residuals (Jarque-Bera), and heteroskedasticity (White), but the Ramsey s RESET test 
for mis-specification is not clear-cut. 
The inclusion of the dummy (Table 3.4a) again confirms the results and improve the models in 
terms of some diagnostics. The Ramsey test, for example, suggests a progress in the models 
specification, although the Durbin-Watson is quite poor, especially in the models from 4 to 6 .   
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Table 3.5  EC representation of the ARDL Model. Dependent variable: logdiff_GDP. Normalized coefficients. 
Regressors ARDL(1,1)FDI 
ARDL(1,1,0)
GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1) 
EDUC 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, OPEN 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, 
EXRAT 
ARDL(1,1,0,0,1)
EDUC, GCFC, 
OPEN 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
lGDP_1
     
0.265 
(2.109) 
** 
lFDI 0.009 0.006 0.005     
(3.411) 
*** 
(2.174) 
** 
(2.043) 
**     
lEDUC 0.662 0.592 0.735 0.930  
(3.690) 
*** 
(2.744) 
*** 
(3.890) 
*** 
(5.398) 
***  
OPEN -0.068 
 
(-2.427) 
** 
lEXRAT -0.043  
(-3.864) 
***  
lEXRAT_1 0.0328  
(3.668) 
***  
EC_1 -0.330 -0.364 -0.368 -0.468 -0.408 -0.495 -0.732 
(-4.591) 
*** 
(-5.927) 
*** 
(-4.182) 
*** 
(-5.563) 
*** 
(-5.402) 
*** 
(-5.868) 
*** 
(-6.362) 
*** 
const 23.719 21.738 23.809 22.155 23.857 23.869 22.951 
(4.564) 
*** 
(5.616) 
*** 
(4.127) 
*** 
(5.427) 
*** 
(5.352) 
*** 
(5.799) 
*** 
(6.440) 
*** 
trend 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.030 0.042 0.028 
(4.279) 
*** 
(5.537) 
*** 
(5.011) 
*** 
(6.481) 
*** 
(5.371) 
*** 
(6.6759 
*** 
(5.865) 
*** 
Diagnostics Statistics 
(p-value)       
R2 0.606 0.661 0.694 0.717 0.721 0.760 0.775 
Durbin-Watson 1.555 1.683 1.801 1.991 1.992 1.816 2.130 
RSS 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 
F-stat 9.398 (0.000) 
11.056 
(0.000) 
21.710 
(0.000) 
22.612 
(0.000) 
22.539 
(0.000) 
55.027 
(0.000) 
39.917 
(0.000) 
2
Reset  1.569 
(0.210) 
3.240 
(0.072) 
7.073 
(0.008) 
4.371 
(0.037) 
3.559 
(0.059) 
3.842 
(0.050) 
1.011 
(0.314) 
2
JB 0.243 
(0.885) 
0.304 
(0.859) 
2.227 
(0.328) 
3.439 
(0.179) 
2.277 
(0.320) 
2.330 
(0.312) 
1.123 
(0.570) 
2
H  8.563 
(0.003) 
8.235 
(0.004) 
4.525 
(0.033) 
6.852 
(0.009) 
4.277 
(0.039) 
6.680 
(0.010) 
5.140 
(0.023) 
 
The symbols ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. T-ratios in parenthesis. 
Durbin  Watson  is the test for residuals autocorrelation. Reset is the Ramsey RESET test for functional form 
mis-specification. JB is the Jarque-Bera for normality of residuals. H is the White for heteroskedasticity. All tests 
have a Chi-Squared distribution.   
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Table 3.5a  EC representation of the ARDL Model. Dependent variable: logdiff_GDP. Normalized coefficients. 
Case with dummy. 
Regressors ARDL(1,1) FDI 
ARDL(1,1,0) 
GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1) 
EDUC 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, GFCF 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, OPEN 
ARDL(1,1,1,0)
EDUC, EXRAT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
lGDP_1 0.310 0.263  0.254   
(3.177) 
*** 
(2.421) 
**  
(2.547) 
**   
lFDI 0.007 0.006 0.005  0.005  
(4.452) 
*** 
(2.916) 
*** 
(2.562) 
***  
(2.562) 
***  
lFDI_1
 
-0.004 -0.006 -0.004  
(-1.816) 
* 
(-3.331) 
*** 
(-1.816 )*  
lEDUC 0.825 0.770 0.825 0.874 
(4.682) 
*** 
(4.301) 
*** 
(4.682) 
*** 
(5.848) 
*** 
OPEN
     
lEXRAT -0.030 
(-3.514) 
** 
lEXRAT_1 0.041 
(5.028) 
*** 
EC_1 -0.537 -0.560 -0.558 -0.870 -0.558 -0.766 
(-6.809) 
*** 
(-8.541) 
*** 
(-6.514) 
*** 
(-8.707 ) 
*** 
(-6.514) 
*** 
(-6.574) 
*** 
Dummy 1982 0.117 0.108 0.123 0.071 0.123 0.086 
(5.440) 
*** 
(6.287) 
*** 
(5.155) 
*** 
(6.637) 
*** 
(5.155) 
*** 
(6.993) 
*** 
const 23.907 22.931 23.838 22.796 23.838 23.903 
(6.809) 
*** 
(8.039) 
*** 
(6.494) 
*** 
(8.537) 
*** 
(6.494) 
*** 
(6.550) 
*** 
trend 0.041 0.041 0.044 0.038 0.044 0.043 
(6.492) 
*** 
(7.775) 
*** 
(6.732) 
*** 
(9.299) 
*** 
(6.732) 
*** 
(7.811) 
*** 
Diagnostics Statistics 
(p-value)      
R2 0.773 0.799 0.824 0.717 0.721 0.760 
Durbin-Watson 1.434 1.755 1.844 0.875 0.824 0.882 
RSS 0.006 0.005 0.005 2.113 1.844 2.188 
F-stat 23.708 (0.000) 
25.698 
(0.000) 
29.279 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
2
Reset  1.577 
(0.691) 
1.308 
(0.253) 
0.018 
(0.891) 
0.402 
(0.526) 
0.014 
(0.903) 
0.218 
(0.640) 
2
JB 0.876 
(0.645) 
1.213 
(0.545) 
0.357 
(0.836) 
2.942 
(0.868) 
2.183 
(0.798) 
2.495 
(0.916) 
2
H  0.790 
(0.374) 
8.804 
(0.003) 
1.861 
(0.172) 
2.942 
(0.086) 
2.183 
(0.139) 
2.495 
(0.114) 
The Pesaran s ARDL analysis is usually completed with the study on the stability of the residuals. 
We have run the Brown et al (1975) stability test, known as CUSUM and CUSUMQ, whose results 
are expressed in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 for the case with trend and dummy. 
In general, the plots of the CUSUM tests confirm that the statistics are within the 5% critical value 
represented by the straight lines, although the models with the variable Educ show some border-line 
results. The plots of the squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMQ) cross the upper straight line in 
the sample period covering the 1980s and the 1990s. 
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The plots of CUSUM and CUSUMQ for the models with trend only are reported in the Appendix.  
Figure 3.5  CUSUM test: Plots of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals for the stability of residuals. Models 
with trend and dummy. 
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Figure 3.6  CUSUMQ test: Plots of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals. Models with trend and 
dummy. 
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We now complete the study with the analysis of the causal relationship between GDP and FDI, in 
particular we will assess the direction of the causality and find which of the following hypothesis 
holds for the case of Egypt: i) FDI-led growth, when FDI supports the economic growth of the host 
country; ii) growth-led FDI, if it is the economic growth that attracts foreign investments; iii) 
bidirectional relationship between FDI and growth. 
We have applied the Toda-Yamamoto approach to a bivariate VAR (k+dmax) model in levels. 
According to the unit-root test, all the variables resulted I(1), while the optimal lag length choosen 
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with the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion is one. Therefore, the lag length for the VAR will be two. We 
have included a trend, although the results do not change in the estimations without trend. For sake 
of completeness, we have estimated a model with three lags, according to the Akaike Information 
Criterion that suggested two lags. 
The models are implemented following the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) as in Rambaldi 
and Doran (1996), see Table 3.6. 
In all the cases, the p-value of the MWald test indicates support of the FDI-leg growth hypothesis, 
with causality directed from FDI to GDP.   
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Table 3.6  Causality test: Toda-Yamamoto approach. 
CASE WITH 
TREND, 2 lags 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from fdi to 
gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_FDI_INFL  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to fdi 
VARIABLES       
const 6.872 ***  62.468   
trend 0.012 ***  0.144   
l_gdp_1 0.989 ***  12.476     
l_gdp_2 -0.277 **  -14.927 *  
l_fdi_infl_1 0.010   0.458 **  
l_fdi_infl_2 0.001 ***  0.367 *  
      
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.011   -2.451   
MWald test 13.880 (0.001) YES 5.101 (0.078) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
CASE NO 
TREND, 2 lags 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from fdi to 
gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_FDI_INFL  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to fdi 
VARIABLES       
Const 0.185   -14.311   
lgdp_1 1.393 ***  17.116 **  
lgdp_2 -0.400 ***  -16.335 **  
lfdi_1 0.007 **  0.416 **  
lfdi_2 -0.007 **  0.284 *  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 0.000   0.781   
MWald test 6.011 (0.050) YES 5.084 (0.079) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
CASE NO 
TREND, 3 lags 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_GDP  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: 
from fdi to 
gdp 
Dependent 
variable: 
l_FDI_INFL  
Significance: 
1%: *** 
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Direction of 
causality: from 
gdp to fdi 
VARIABLES       
const 0.283   -6.913   
l_gdp_1 1.166 ***  1.796   
l_gdp_2 -0.275   -1.205   
l_gdp_3 0.099   -0.028   
l_fdi_infl_1 0.011 ***  0.666 ***  
l_fdi_infl_2 -0.003   0.381 ***  
l_fdi_infl_3 -0.008 ***  -0.398 ***  
Sum of lagged 
coefficients 
0.0002   0.5626   
MWald test 16.734 (0.001) YES 2.867 (0.412) 
NO 
CAUSALITY 
The results of the causality analysis (Table 3.6) seem to suggest that Egypt is already an attractive 
country for foreign investments. However, since the coefficients of the long-run and short-run 
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cointegration relationship are quite small, we do not expect a further increase in FDI to affect GDP 
significantly. 
However, the country s attractiveness seems to be mainly due to a large availability of oil and gas 
resources. This is clearly expressed by the sectorial composition of FDI, where the oil sector 
represents almost 80% of total investments.  
In spite of the improvements in legislation and the Government efforts, one of the weakest points in 
Egypt is still the level of corruption and lack of transparency and accountability, as stated in the 
Transparency International Country Profile 2009. While the judiciary system is recognized as one 
of the most independent and least corrupt public institution in Egypt, the country has to deal with 
frequent conflict of interests of parlamentarians who are prominent figures in the business 
community . The public sector as well appears highly corrupt and poor performing in terms of 
accountability, integrity and transparency. The overall negative effect on the economy is clear, 
given the large importance of the public-owned companies Egypt, and the inflows of FDI could be 
harmed too by the perceived corruption. 
After the implementation of the economic structural reforms, the country should now embark in the 
improvement of transparency and accountability at all levels of the civil society. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied the causal relationship between FDI and GDP in Egypt. The policy of 
openness, implemented since the mid-1970s and confirmed in the 1990s under the ERSAP 
Programme for structural reforms, should have turned Egypt into an attractive countries for foreign 
investments. 
Indeed, the FDI increased dramatically in the early 2000s, but they have been mainly concentrated 
in the oil sector. Thus, the inflow of new technology and managerial skills has been limited to a 
specific economic sector, that, besides, is still under strict governmental control.  
The favourable tax regime of the Free Zones could be a further incentive to foreign investments, 
although with the possible risk that the benefits are again limited to the Free Zones areas. 
However, the Government has still to deal with the issue of corruption. The perceived lack of 
transparency and accountability is harmful in any country.  
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Appendix to Part 3  
The following Table A reports the F-tests for all the model estimated. In all cases, the computed F 
statistics falls above the upper critical value.  
Table 3.A  Pesaran cointegration test. Dependent variable: lGDP. 
Progr. Regressors F-test 95 % 
Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
90 % 
Lower 
Bound 
90% Upper 
Bound 
1 lFDI 23.5393 7.104 7.910 5.862 6.568 
2 lFDI, lGFCF 19.5411 5.409 6.407 4.515 5.391 
3 lFDI, lEDUC 6.6289 5.409 6.407 4.515 5.391 
4 lFDI, OPEN 15.387 5.409 6.407 4.515 5.391 
5 lFDI, lEXRAT 15.4062 5.409 6.407 4.515 5.391 
6 lFDI, LEDUC, 
lGFCF 
6.6513 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
7 lFDI, LEDUC, 
OPEN 
6.6082 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
8 lFDI, LEDUC, 
LEXRAT 
5.6241 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
9 lFDI, LGFCF, 
EXRAT 
15.1675 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
10 lFDI, LGFCF, 
OPEN 
14.6096 4.431 5.666 3.720 4.813 
11 lFDI, LEDUC, 
LGFCF, OPEN 
15.1323 3.944 5.127 3.307 4.377 
12 lFDI, LEDUC, 
LEXRAT, LGFCF 
5.1561 3.944 5.127 3.307 4.377 
13 lFDI, LEDUC, 
OPEN, LEXRAT 
5.9325 3.944 5.127 3.307 4.377 
14 lFDI, LGFCF, 
OPEN, LEXRAT 
12.0826 3.944 5.127 3.307 4.377 
Figure A and Figure B show the plots of the CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests on the recursive residuals 
for the models with trend only. In some cases, the plots fall outside the critical value of 5% 
represented by the straight line, in particular in the models with the variable Educ and in the time 
period 1980s-1990s.  
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Figure 3.A  CUSUM test: Plots of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals. Models with trend only.  
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Figure 3.B  CUSUMQ test: Plots of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals. Models with trend only.. 
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Conclusion
 
In this work we have attempted to assess whether some major economic reforms implemented in 
Egypt since the 1960s had a positive effect on the country s GDP. 
The first reform in chronological order was adopted in the 1960s to reach the goal of free basic 
education for all . It was then improved in the 1980s with the introduction of compulsory 
attendance at the preparatory level. In the 1990s the Government supported the shift of enrollments 
towards the vocational secondary school, in order to meet the firms needs. These two latter reforms 
seem to have reached the goal of increasing the productivity expressed as GDP per worker. Sure 
enough, we have found that the improvement of the quality of human capital in terms of average 
years of education had a positive effect on GDP per worker. It must be recognized that such result 
would not have been achieved without the first reform of the 1960s that paved the way to the 
subsequent reforms. 
Again in the 1990s, the IMF supported Egypt in a Structural Reforms Programme (ERSAP) that 
called for a progressive liberalization of trade and for more incentives to FDI. 
Although we might be able to assess a positive effect of trade on GDP when the time series is 
extended to a longer time period, at present our results support the opposite Growth-led Export 
(GLE) hypothesis. The analysis focused on trade with the European Union shows instead a 
bidirectional relationship. Yet, imports are fundamental for the assessment of such causal 
relationships. This suggests that Egypt could gain if she will be able to enhance her role of 
transformer of intermediate goods. 
With regard to FDI, we have not been able to detect any significant positive relationship from FDI 
to GDP. Egypt implemented important reforms in order to attract foreign investments, particularly 
she eased the legislation on labour and the bureaucratic procedures needed to establish a new 
enterprise. Thus, the country seems to be already prepared to attract FDI, and indeed they have 
increased significantly in the recent years. Unfortunately, they are mainly concentrated in the oil 
sector (about 80% of total FDI according to recent data from the Egyptian Central Bank), that is 
under strict governmental control, while the investors are multinational firms. In such a situation, 
the foreign investments do not seem to provide the expected widespread effects in terms of inflows 
of managerial skills or higher productivity of the local workforce. 
Yet, the country still has to deal with high levels of corruption, little transparency and 
accountability of the public sector. Although excluded by the analysis, the recent political events 
since 2011 have introduced an additional element of perceived instability, that will probably further 
affect negatively the attractiveness of the country for foreign investments in the coming years.  
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